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COOPERATION AND TURNOVER IN LAW 
FACULTIES: 
A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL AND AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
SHI-LING HSU*
A standard account of group cooperation would predict that group stability 
would bring about greater cooperation because repeat-play games would allow 
for sanctions and rewards.  In an academic unit such as a department or a law 
faculty, one might thus expect that faculty stability would bring about greater 
cooperation.  However, academic units are not like most other groups.  Tenured 
professors face only limited sanctions for failing to cooperate, for engaging in 
unproductive conflict, or for shirking.  This article argues counter-intuitively 
that within limits, some level of faculty turnover may enhance cooperation. 
Certainly, excessive and persistent loss of faculty is demoralizing, and reduces 
the number of individuals among which administrative work can be spread.  But 
for less dire losses, faculty turnover may play the disciplining role that 
academic units are deprived of by the tenure system. 
This article sets forth a game-theoretic model showing how the possibility 
of faculty turnover may induce greater cooperation in a faculty.  The intuition 
is that while some antisocial behavior in a faculty—fighting or shirking—may 
garner some short-term gains at the expense of others, the possibility of exit 
may reduce this behavior, because loss of a colleague could be worse than the 
gains from fighting or shirking.  Losing a colleague means probably losing a 
productive colleague, taking the time to replace her, and possibly replacing her 
with a less productive substitute.  These downsides may play a role in curbing 
unproductive behavior in a faculty.  This article presents some empirical 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that faculty turnover short of some 
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excessive amount does, in fact, produce higher levels of collegiality and 
collaboration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tenet of game theory is that the longer groups stay intact, 
the higher the likelihood of cooperation.1  The late Elinor Ostrom, a political 
* D?Alemberte Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs, Florida State 
University College of Law.  The author would like to acknowledge the help and comments of Joshua 
Gottlieb, Jake Linford, Jonathan Nash, Wayne Logan, Nicholas Georgakopoulous, Fred Tung, Jeffrey 
Kahn, Gregory Sisk, and especially Jon Lutz and Mary McCormick and the always-helpful FSU Law 
library staff.  This article benefitted from the research assistance of Kevin Alford, Jazz Tomassetti, 
Daniel Wolfe, Alexandra Holliday, and Jessica Farrell. 
1. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390, 1392 
(1981) (stating that individuals are more likely to cooperate the higher the probability that they will 
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scientist who won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2009,2 is best-known for 
her groundbreaking study of group cooperation in resource management, in 
which she analyzed a dozen case  studies of long-lived communities sustainably 
managing a common-pool resource.3  Be it fish,4 forests,5 or groundwater,6 and 
be they Turkish,7 Swiss,8 or Californian,9 a key ingredient to successful 
communal resource management, Ostrom found, was long-term stability of the 
community.10  In game-theoretic parlance, long-term group stability means that 
individuals who ?cheat??who engage in uncooperative, selfish, or destructive 
behavior11?can be punished by the group.12  The threat of punishment does not 
work if individuals can avoid it by simply leaving the group.13
Cooperation is essential to academic departments and colleges. 
Cooperation means different things in different disciplines,14 but all other things 
interact again in the future).  The Prisoner?s Dilemma game posits that two crime suspects are captured 
and separated for interrogation by a prosecutor.  With a certain incentive structure, it can be shown that 
rational self-interest can overcome collective interests, and that each prisoner would rationally choose 
to confess, or ?cheat? on her co-conspirator. See, e.g., ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED
ECONOMISTS 2?4 (1992).  Group stability is modeled by repetitions of the Prisoner?s Dilemma game, 
in which cooperative behavior?not confessing?emerges as a stable outcome. Axelrod & Hamilton, 
supra, at 1393. 
2. Elinor Ostrom Facts, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, (2018) 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economics/2009/ostrom/facts/ [https://perma.cc/Z87D-L9BA] (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
3. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
4. Id. at 18?21. 
5. Id. at 59?65.
6. Id. at 104?42.
7. Id. at 18?21.
8. Id. at 59?65.
9. Id. at 104?42.
10. Id. at 88. ?????he populations in these locations have remained stable over long periods of
time.  Individuals have shared a past and expect to share a future.  It is important for individuals to 
maintain their reputations as reliable members of the community.  These individuals live side by side 
and farm the same plots year after year.  They expect their children and their grandchildren to inherit 
their land.?); see also Ara Norenzayan & Azim F. Shariff, The Origin and Evolution of Religious 
Prosociality, 322 SCI. 58, 58 (2008) (arguing that religious groups show high levels of cooperation 
because of group stability). 
11. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 980?81 (2000). 
12. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1395; see also OSTROM, supra note 3, at 20 (?The few 
infractions that have occurred have been handled easily by the fishers at the local coffeehouse.?).
13. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1395; see also Fehr & Gächter, supra note 11 at 984?
85. 
14. Jenny M. Lewis et al., The How and Why of Academic Collaboration: Disciplinary 
Difference and Policy Implications, 64 J. HIGHER EDUC. 693, 697?98 (2012). 
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being equal, the more open academics are to working with their colleagues, the 
more productive they tend to be.15  Faculty members must work together on 
governance, hiring, administrative matters and, most importantly, the work of 
research and discovery.16  The essence of cooperation in academia is the 
frequent and robust exchange of ideas and critiques, and research collaboration 
in pursuit of shared goals.17  Certainly, fighting and bickering, or shirking 
duties, is not cooperation, and is not conducive to collaboration.  
Academic institutions are in fact structured to facilitate collaboration. 
Faculty members are placed in close physical proximity,18 provided with 
generous meeting spaces,19 and get to choose their own colleagues,20 with 
whom they would presumably be more inclined to collaborate.  And yet, 
collaboration across disciplines is uneven.21  Law faculties, if collaboration is 
measured by co-authorship, lag.22  This study surveyed all U.S. law journals in 
the Hein Online database, and found only 1,060 articles that were co-authored 
15. See, e.g., Sooho Lee & Barry Bozeman, The Impact of Research Collaboration on Scientific
Productivity, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 673, 693?94 (2005); James D. Adams et al., Scientific Teams and 
Institutional Collaborations: Evidence from U.S. Universities, 1981?1999, 34 RES. POL?Y 259 (2005); 
Harriet Zuckerman, Nobel Laureates in Science: Patterns of Productivity, Collaboration, and 
Authorship, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 391, 393?98 (1967); Miranda Lee Pao, Collaboration in Computational 
Musicology, 33 J. AM. SOC?Y INFORMATIONAL SCI. 38, 38-??? ???????????????? ????????????????
?????-?????????Dual Approach to Multiple Authorship in the Study of Collaboration/Scientific Output 
Relationship, 10 SCIENTOMETRICS 259, 278 (1986); Réjean Landry et al., An Econometric Analysis of 
the Effect of Collaboration on Academic Research Productivity, 32 HIGHER EDUC. 283 (1996). But see 
Vicki L. Hesli & Jae Mook Lee, Faculty Research Productivity: Why Do Some of Our Colleagues 
Publish More than Others?, 44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 393, 396 (2011). 
16. Derek J. de Solla Price & Donald Beaver, Collaboration in an Invisible College, 21 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST ?????????????????????T]here is a good correlation between the productivities and the 
amount of collaboration of the authors.  The most prolific man is also by far the most 
collaborating . . . ??); see also infra Part II. 
17. See, e.g., Barry Bozeman et al., Research Collaboration in Universities and Academic
Entrepreneurship: The State-of-the-Art, 38 J. TECH. TRANSFER 1, 3 (2013) (?We define collaboration 
as ?social processes whereby human beings pool their human capital for the objective of producing 
knowledge.??). 
18. See, e.g., Peter Dizikes, The Office Next Door, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 25, 2011),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/425881/the-office-next-door/ [https://perma.cc/P6ZW-XASN] 
(explaining how Nobel Laureate Robert Solow benefited, as a junior faculty member, from having an 
office across the hall from Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson). 
19. See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Elena Kagan and the Miracle at Harvard, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC.
67, 71 (2011). 
20. Jon W. Bruce & Michael I. Swygert, The Law Faculty Hiring Process, 18 HOUS. L. REV.
215, 264 (1981); William O. Brown, Jr., University Governance and Academic Tenure: A Property 
Rights Explanation, 153 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 441, 456 (1997). 
21. Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 693?94.
22. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Joining Forces: The Role of Collaboration in the
Development of Legal Thought, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 559, 563?67 (2002). 
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by faculty members within the same law school,23 out of the total of 105,832 
total articles written over the eight-year sample period24?a measly 1%.25
Why, despite an institutional structure designed to facilitate collaboration, 
is it so hard to get law professors?who choose their own colleagues, it bears 
repeating?to work with each other?  This article offers only a partial but 
important and surprising answer: tenure.26  This article illustrates, using a game-
theoretic model, how tenure inhibits the imposition of sanctions, undermining 
incentives to cooperate.  In theory, tenure creates group stability which should 
lead to more cooperation.  But in practice, tenure gives faculty members the 
ability to ?check out??minimize engagement in law school life?when faculty 
relations sour.27
There is one partial saving mechanism for academic units: exit.  Faculty 
members sometimes leave for another job, often at another university.  Whereas 
defection makes cooperation difficult in most group settings, the possibility of 
losing colleagues may actually make academic units more cooperative, to a 
point.28  Replacing departed colleagues is costly and time-consuming, as faculty 
hiring service is notoriously time-consuming.29  Even disenchanted faculty 
members might be more collegial towards colleagues if they believe that a 
departure is possible, and that they may be called upon to do the hard work of 
replacing them.  
This article presents a game-theoretic model of faculty cooperation, and 
provides some empirical evidence that the threat of faculty loss may actually 
increase faculty collegiality and collaboration.  The institution of tenure not 
only dulls the incentives for tenured faculty to excel and produce,30 but removes 
the most meaningful sanctions for non-cooperation, giving unhappy faculty 
members the freedom to engage in unproductive fighting and bickering, or 
23. This article addresses the cooperation within a faculty, and so only measures within-faculty
collaborations.  Professors often collaborate with faculty at other institutions, but that does not speak 
to the propensity of faculty members to collaborate with their immediate colleagues. 
24. E-mail from Adam Tramp, HeinOnline Technical Support, to Shi-Ling Hsu, (Feb. 7, 2018)
(on file with author). 
25. Co-authored articles that combined faculty from different law schools was much higher, at
24%, as discussed infra notes 64?68 and accompanying text. 
26. Tenure is, of course, not unique to law faculties, so it is at most a partial explanation.  A
number of factors contribute to the propensity to collaborate that differentiate law faculties from other 
types of academic units. This article just addresses the effects of tenure and turnover on law faculties
as a partial explanation of cooperation. See discussion infra notes 64?68.
27. See infra notes 101?132 and accompanying text.
28. An excessive loss of faculty, such that it is inevitable and consuming, would generate the
uncooperative behavior predicted by game theory.  This is discussed infra in sections III.C. and IV.B. 
29. Bruce & Swygert, supra note 20, at 264.
30. See infra section III.A.
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shirking, without fear of sanction.31  Meanwhile, the prospect of toiling or 
fighting with uncooperative colleagues, or picking up the slack for shirking 
colleagues, makes more appealing the option of changing jobs and moving.  If 
exit is a credible threat, then it changes the calculus for the uncooperative 
faculty member: the daunting prospect of having to replace a lost colleague may 
actually impose some discipline.  This article provides some empirical evidence 
that, contrary to the prevailing notion that group stability increases cooperation, 
academic units experience more cooperation if there is some threat of moderate, 
non-excessive instability.  
I hasten to emphasize that this article is not a call or part of a campaign to 
abolish or curtail the granting of tenure at law schools or more broadly, 
institutions of higher learning.  It is, however, an examination of an overlooked 
and counter-intuitive effect of tenure.  In the interests of understanding intra-
faculty dynamics, it is worth making a complete accounting of the costs and 
benefits of tenure.  Part II of this article reviews the literature on cooperation, 
and the link to productivity.  Part III of this article lays out the argument that 
tenure, while valuable for a number of vitally important reasons, undermines 
cooperation and enables antisocial behavior.  Part IV sets forth the game-
theoretic model illustrating how the threat of exit?a lateral move by a faculty 
member?may replace some of the discipline lost to the institution of tenure.  
Part V describes in detail the data sources used in this study, and sets out the 
empirical evidence supporting these hypotheses.  Part VI concludes by 
suggesting some academic policies that might facilitate collaboration in law 
faculties, and possibly other academic units. 
II. COOPERATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
Why do some organizations produce more innovation than others?  The 
model of organizational creativity is Bell Labs, originally the research arm of 
telephone monopolist AT&T.32  Over its roughly eighty-five-year history, Bell 
Labs scientists developed the world?s first solar photovoltaic energy cell,33
communications satellite,34 fiber optic cables,35 cell phone system,36 modern 
31. See infra section III.B.
32. JON GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF AMERICAN
INNOVATION 30?31 (2012).
33. Id. at 170?72.
34. Id. at 202?04.
35. Id. at 275?79.
36. Id. at 279?83.
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operating system (UNIX),37 modern computer language (C),38 and the 
fundamental building block of modern electronics, the transistor.39  Thirteen 
times a Bell Labs scientist has won or shared in a Nobel Prize in Physics.40  That 
would rank Bell Labs, if it were a country, fourth behind only the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Germany, and ahead of France, Japan, and the 
combined Soviet Union and Russia.41
What has been the secret to Bell Labs?s remarkable record of creativity and 
innovation?  The founding precept of Bell Labs was collaboration.42  In fact, 
Bell Labs?s space was designed to maximize contact among its researchers.43
Offices were spaced so that researchers, in order to reach restrooms and 
cafeterias, had to walk past other workspaces like ?a magnet rolling past iron 
filings.?44  This active creation of opportunities for chance encounters was 
crucial in producing productive collaborations.45  At the same time, Bell Labs 
created a culture of enrichment and curiosity.46  Bell offered every employee, 
no matter how junior or senior, advanced graduate-level training in its 
Communications Development Training Program, or ?Kelly College,?47 where 
employees seeking to sharpen their technical skills would gather and share 
ideas.48  What was surprising was how much senior scientists learned just by 
sharing their skills with junior employees.49
These and other lessons in collaboration in organizational creativity have 
not been lost on institutions of higher learning and the governments that fund 
37. Id. at 261. 
38. Id.
39. Id. at 163?70. 
40. Ryan Francis, Nobel Prize Latest in Long Line for Bell Labs, NETWORK WORLD, (Oct. 7, 
2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2869896/lan-wan/nobel-prize-latest-in-long-
line-for-bell-labs.html [https://perma.cc/F6TN-2QBC]. 
41. Countries With the Most Nobel Prizes in the Field of Physics, WORLD ATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-most-nobel-laureates-in-the-field-of-
physics.html [https://perma.cc/GC6D-5HN4] (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
42. GERTNER, supra note 32, at 134 (?So many of the wartime and post war breakthroughs?the 
Manhattan project, radar, the transistor?were clearly group efforts, a compilation of the ideas and 
inventions of individuals bound together with common purposes and complementary talents.  And the 
phone system, with its almost unfathomable complexity, was by definition a group effort.?). 
43. Id. at 151. 
44. Id. at 77. 
45. Felichsim Kabo et al., Shared Paths to the Lab: A Sociospatial Network Analysis of 
Collaboration, 47 ENV?T & BEHAV. 57, 75?79 (2015). 
46. GERTNER, supra note 32, at 153?54. 
47. So named for the Bell Labs director that created the program, Mervyn Kelly. Id. at 153. 
48. Id. at 153?54. 
49. Id. at 154. 
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them.50  Funding agencies like the National Science Foundation and the 
National Institutes of Health have reduced funding rates and increased grant 
amounts, creating incentives for larger research teams.51  Research ?centers?
have popped up on campuses to try and smash interested researchers together 
to collaborate in pursuit of those scarce research funds52 which, person-for-
person, have in fact been more prolific than regular departments.53  Universities 
have gradually become receptive to industry funding54 which, while raising 
some governance questions,55 have helped create fruitful university?industry 
collaborations.56  Interdisciplinary research, which necessitates collaboration?
and was also a pioneering hallmark of Bell Labs57?has become a clarion call 
at research universities.58
50. See, e.g., Andreas Schwab & William H. Starbuck, Collegial “Nests” Can Foster Critical 
Thinking, Innovative Ideas, and Scientific Progress, 14 STRATEGIC ORG. 167, 168?71 (2016); 
Giovanni Abramo et al., Research Collaboration and Productivity: Is There Correlation?, 57 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. 155, 156 (2009). 
51. Bruce Alberts et al., Rescuing US Biomedical Research From Its Systemic Flaws, 111 PROC.
NAT?L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5773, 5775 (2014). 
52. P. Craig Boardman & Elizabeth A. Corley, University Research Centers and the 
Composition of Research Collaborations, 37 RES. POL?Y 900, 900 (2008) (?Perhaps the singular 
feature that all university research centers, broadly defined, have in common is the intention to foster 
collaboration among researchers.?). 
53. Branco L. Ponomariov & P. Craig Boardman, Influencing Scientists’ Collaboration and 
Productivity Patterns Through New Institutions: University Research Centers and Scientific and 
Technical Human Capital, 39 RES. POL?Y 613, 623 (2010) (?The results presented in this study suggest 
that affiliation with a university research center affects the behavior of affiliated faculty in ways 
consistent with the common emphases and goals in such center programs: increased productivity, 
collaboration . . . and interdisciplinarity??). 
54. Magnus Gulbrandsen & Jens-Christian Smeby, Industry Funding and University Professors’
Research Performance, 34 RES. POL?Y 932, 932 (2005); Yong S. Lee, The Sustainability of University-
Industry Research Collaboration: An Empirical Assessment, 25 J. TECH. TRANSFER 111, ???????
(2000). 
55. Gulbrandsen & Smeby, supra note 54, at 933 (?Some are worried, others not, about the 
consequences of universities? external orientation and changed funding base . . . ??). 
56. Lee, supra note 54, at 117?21.  Research centers may also incorporate industry researchers 
into the research of an academic in a positive way that actual industry employment would not. James 
S. Dietz & Barry Bozeman, Academic Careers, Patents, and Productivity: Industry Experience as 
Scientific and Technical Human Capital, 34 RES. POL?Y 349, 362?63 (2005). 
57. GERTNER, supra note 32, at 134 (?[As Bell Labs Nobel Laureate William] Shockley would 
later point out, that by the middle of the twentieth century the process of innovation in electronics had 
progressed to the point that a vast amount of multidisciplinary expertise was needed to bring any given 
project to fruition.?). 
58. See, e.g., DIANA RHOTEN, NAT?L SCI. FOUND., A MULTI-METHOD ANALYSIS OF THE 
SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL CONDITIONS FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATION (2003), http://ssrc-
cdn1.s3.amazonaws.com/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B91820A2E-B970-DE11-BD80-
001CC477EC70%7D.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GZM-DM4U]. 
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It is thus a source of some irritation to academic administrators that not all 
units on campus have joined in the trend towards working in cooperative teams.  
Scientific and technical disciplines that may require sophisticated equipment 
for research have moved quickly to collaborative research in order to share in 
the costs of expensive laboratories.59  So, too, have quantitative social sciences, 
such as psychology and economics.60  Other fields, such as English and Literary 
Studies, still feature solo researchers as the norm.61  Humanities and philosophy 
also evidently do not harbor ?cultures? of collaboration.62  Anthropology is 
apparently such a fractious discipline that people just can?t get along with each 
other enough to collaborate.63
Generally speaking, collaboration among law faculty is low relative to other 
types of academic departments,64 and intra-faculty collaboration?specifically 
between professors at the same institutions?is very low.65  As noted above,66
in the 2005?2013 time period spanned by this study, only 1% of all articles in 
the Hein Online database had more than one author from the same faculty.  
Forty law schools?more than one-fifth of all U.S. law schools?had zero 
internally co-authored articles at all for eight years.67  Comparing apples to 
apples, this study estimates that the rate of law journal co-authorship of any 
kind?not just intra-faculty?was about 24%,68 a much higher figure than for 
intra-faculty co-authorship.69  But that still pales in comparison with the co-
59. NAT?L SCI. BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2016, ch.5, at 31?33 (2016), 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/#/downloads/report [https://perma.cc/M9EM-ZLJV]; 
Adams et al., supra note 15, at 259?60. 
60. Aidan Hollis, Co-authorship and the Output of Academic Economists, 8 LABOUR ECON. 503, 
514 (2001) (economics); Blaise Cronin et al., A Cast of Thousands: Co-authorship and Sub-authorship 
Collaboration in the 20th Century as Manifested in the Scholarly Journal Literature of Psychology 
and Philosophy, 54 J. AM. SOC?Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 855, 860 (2003) (Table 3, showing increasing 
rates of multiple authorship in Psychology); John M. McDowell & Michael Melvin, The Determinants 
of Co-authorship: An Analysis of the Economics Literature, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 155, 155 (1983). 
61. Elizabeth Leane et al., Co-authorship Trends in English Literary Studies, 1995–2015, 44
STUD. HIGHER EDUC. 503, 514 (2017) (showing co-authorship rate in literary studies of 4%). 
62. Lewis et al., supra note 14, at 699?700. 
63. Id.
64. George & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 563?67. 
65. E-mail from Adam Tramp, supra note 24. 
66. See supra notes 23?25 and accompanying text. 
67. E-mail from Adam Tramp, supra note 24. 
68. This figure includes articles in U.S. law journals that are co-authored by non-professorial 
lawyers, such as practitioners.  This is in line with a previous estimate by George & Guthrie, supra 
note 22, at 562?66, which found co-authorship rates in ?elite? law reviews and all law reviews to be 
below 20%. 
69. E-mail from Adam Tramp, supra note 24. 
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authorship rates of 70%?90% in other fields.70  Collaboration and cooperation 
can take many forms, but if co-authorship is an indicator, then the legal 
academy appears not to be trending that way.71
 This is something of a shame for the legal academy, because considerable 
research supports the proposition that faculty members who collaborate with 
their colleagues are more prolific researchers72 and more successful teachers.73
The very essence of collegiality is the immediacy of feedback and exchange 
that quickly distills ideas.  Collaboration also implies some division of labor, 
whereby different faculty members may bring different and complementary 
skills to a research endeavor.74  While many researchers still make great 
discoveries working solo, as a statistical matter, collaboration is a robustly 
positive predictor of creative productivity.75  Co-authored papers are more often 
cited than sole-authored papers.76  It could be that causality runs in the other 
direction: that co-authorship is really a mechanism for publishing more.77  But 
even accounting for the fact that co-authorship implies some division of credit 
for a co-authored article, the very practice of co-authorship tends to increase 
the page productivity, or ?publication efficiency? of faculty researchers.78
III. TENURE AND UNCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR
As emphasized above, this article is not a call or part of a campaign to 
abolish or curtail the granting of tenure at institutions of higher learning.  I only 
70. See supra notes 59?60; George & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 566. 
71. It is worth noting that almost all law teaching materials, including casebooks and treatises, 
are co-authored.  This is certainly a form of collaboration, and an important one for an academy that 
still delivers legal education in largely a lecture format. George & Guthrie, supra note 22, at 559. 
72. See sources cited supra note 15.
73. Lee, supra note 54, at 124 (showing benefits of industry collaboration to teaching through 
statistical results); Min-Wei Lin & Barry Bozeman, Researchers’ Industry Experience and 
Productivity in University-Industry Research Centers: A “Scientific and Technical Human Capital”
Explanation, 31 J. TECH. TRANSFER 269, 282?83 (2006). 
74. Andy H. Barnett et al., The Rising Incidence of Co-authorship in Economics: Further 
Evidence, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 539, 541 (1988); McDowell & Melvin, supra note 60, at 156. 
75. See sources cited supra note 15.
76. F. Narin et al., Scientific Co-Operation in Europe and the Citation of Multinationally 
Authored Papers, 21 SCIENTOMETRICS 313, 322?23 (1991); G. Lewison & P. Cunningham, 
Bibliometric Studies for the Evaluation of Trans-national Research, 21 SCIENTOMETRICS 223, 242 
(1991); Adams et al., supra note 15, at 260. 
77. McDowell & Melvin, supra note 60, at 155. 
78. Garey C. Durden & Timothy J. Perri, Co-authorship and Publication Efficiency, 23 
ATLANTIC ECON. J. 69, 74 (Table 2) (1995); Joe C. Davis & Debra Moore Patterson, Determinants of 
Variations in Journal Publication Rates of Economists, 45 AM. ECONOMIST 86, 89 (2001); Kellie L. 
Maske et al., Determinants of Scholarly Productivity Among Male and Female Economists, 41 ECON.
INQUIRY 555, 562 (2003). 
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mention here in passing a body of work that has come to the defense of tenure 
in the past, against attacks that have sometimes been a bit too casual in their 
inferences,79 and which sometimes belie a distinctly political axe to grind.80
Tenure is necessary to allow the incubation of ideas on long time frames.  
Academic units undertake the research eschewed by industry, government, and 
other research bodies, because these less insulated institutions only undertake 
research that can be translated into tangible and monetizable benefits over a 
relatively short time frame.81  In non-academic sectors, there is pressure to 
undertake projects from which they can capture most of the rents of the resultant 
intellectual property.82  Much research in academic institutions is by design not 
susceptible of immediate practical application, but is basic, fundamental 
research that may be rich in positive spillovers.83  Were research decisions not 
insulated by tenure, academic research could well look much like industrial 
research, with nobody available to undertake basic research.84  It is also easy to 
imagine how tenure protects researchers from inefficient ?ravages and 
vagaries . . . of institutional politics inside universities.?85  Moreover, 
notwithstanding the numerous circulating polemics about of lazy professors,86
tenure is actually an efficient division of labor given the highly specialized 
79. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Corruption Theory and Practice, 14 CONTEMP. ECON. POL?Y 6, 
9 (1996) (?Normally, the argument for tenure is on the grounds that tenure increases the difficulty for 
politically powerful people to pick on people with independent minds.  This is basically ridiculous 
since the people who have independent thoughts tend to be young.?). 
80. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, INSIDE AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE DECLINE, THE 
DECEPTION, THE DOGMAS, 229 (1993) (?Since the 1960s, at least, the conformity of the academic 
world has been an internally imposed conformity of the left, culminating in the ?political correct?
fashions of the 1980s and 1990s.  Tenure and academic freedom have not protected individual diversity 
of thought on campus but instead have protected those who choose to impose the prevailing ideology 
through classroom brainwashing of students and storm trooper tactics against outside speakers who 
might challenge this ideology.?).
81. Richard B. McKenzie, In Defense of Academic Tenure, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 325, 339 (1996) (noting that abolition of tenure would ?[r]educe the willingness 
of faculty . . . to undertake long-term, risky research . . ??). 
82. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, Research and Development in the Growth Process, 1 J.
ECON. GROWTH, 49, 50 (1996) (?Research produces fundamental knowledge, which by itself may not 
be useful but which opens up windows of opportunity, whereas the purpose of development is to 
generate secondary knowledge, which will allow those opportunities to be realized.?). 
83. McKenzie, supra note 81, at 330 (noting the public goods nature of research). 
84. Id. at 339. 
85. Id. at 326. 
86. Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 325, 327 (1990), (?The attacks tend to be hit-and-run?) (citing
The Tenure Temptation: Don’t Give Professors Lifetime Jobs, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1987, at 15); 
see also, SOWELL, supra note 80, at 229; see generally ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: HOW 
POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION (1990). 
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nature of most academic research, and probably the best means of evaluating 
long-term value.87  Finally, it is important to note that problems with monitoring 
performance of professors is not at all unique to the academy.  Whenever and 
wherever sophisticated and complicated work is carried out, information 
asymmetries create tensions between principal and agent that are not always 
resolved satisfactorily.88  Academic tenure is just the imperfect resolution of 
these tensions in the academic labor market, a price paid for the enormous 
societal benefits produced by academic research.89
This article is also limited to an examination of one effect of tenure on law 
faculties, as opposed to academic units generally.  Other types of academic 
units grant tenure to faculty and still experience very high rates of research 
collaboration.90  There are a number of institutional and structural reasons for 
that.  As noted above, in some fields productive collaboration yields funding 
and other benefits that are highly sought after even after tenure.91  Access to 
laboratories and instrumentation are vital to the research of many technical and 
scientific disciplines, necessitating collaboration in a way that the legal 
academy does not.92  This article only offers one explanation for why some law 
faculty forego cooperation, and does not seek to generalize to other fields of 
study.  
A. The Effect of Tenure on Faculty Behavior—Productivity 
All that said, it still important to understand intra-faculty dynamics through 
a lens that incorporates a condition as important as tenure.  Even thoughtful and 
nuanced treatments concede that tenure creates incentives for shirking or 
87. Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, Tenure Issues in Higher Education, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1999, at 85, 92?94; Michael S. McPherson & Gordon C. Winston, The 
Economics of Academic Tenure: A Relational Perspective, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163, 164?65
(1983). 
88. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES:
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 29 (2002); McKenzie, supra note 81, at 330 (?The more sophisticated, 
esoteric, and varied the job to be done, the more likely managerial control will be relegated to the 
workers themselves.?). 
89. Economists have estimated the economic benefits of different economic sectors, and found 
that academic medical research alone?not counting any other academic fields?has contributed $3.2 
trillion every year since 1970. Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, The Value of Health and 
Longevity, 114 J. POL. ECON. 871, 872 (2006). 
90. See supra Part II. 
91. See, e.g., Lee & Bozeman, supra note 15, at 683 (????xperimental scientists often use large 
and costly instrumentation that requires a large number of collaborators.?); Adams et al., supra note 
15, at 283. 
92. See, e.g., NAT?L SCI. BD., supra note 59, at ch.5, 45?46. 
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fighting.93  It is important to understand the negative effects of tenure not to 
justify its abolition, but for academic institutions to develop ways to simulate 
more dynamic work environments.  
To begin with, tenure largely removes the most serious sanction for bad 
behavior, at least from the perspective of administrators charged with managing 
academic units: dismissal.  Different institutions have different standards, but 
the most common restriction on dismissal allows it only for ?adequate cause,?94
language that has proven to be a high bar for removal.95  While lurid anecdotes 
of academic fecklessness or miscreancy96 prove much less than supposed, the 
security of an effective lifetime appointment must undeniably create some 
complacency at some point, for almost all academics.97  Shirking in research, 
teaching, or service is common enough that it would surely be astounding to 
find an academic that claims to be unfamiliar with it.98
Indeed, as a general matter, post-tenure productivity is lower than pre-
tenure productivity.99  The evidence is fairly robust that after a certain point, 
academics become less productive as they age, both in terms of quantity of 
research and writing and influence.100  A study by Michael Swygert and 
Nathaniel Gozanksy of publications by law faculty members at the Full 
Professor rank found that senior faculty members publish at low rates relative 
to younger colleagues.101  They found that from 1980 to 1983 (admittedly a 
very different time for the legal academy), 1,950 senior law faculty published 
2,992 articles, an average of 1.53 over the four-year period.102  Over 20% had 
only one, and over 44% had zero publications.103  As is the case with other 
93. McKenzie, supra note 81, at 327 (?Professors do, at times (if not often), exploit tenure by 
shirking their duties in the classroom, in their research, and in their service to their universities.?). 
94. Brown & Kurland, supra note 86, at 325. 
95. Id. at 344. 
96. See, e.g., Napp Nazworth, Analysis: Problem with Higher Ed is Not Lazy Professors; A 
Response to Gov. Scott Walker, THE CHRISTIAN POST, (Feb. 11, 2015, 8:08 AM), 
https://www.christianpost.com/news/analysis-problem-with-higher-ed-is-not-lazy-professors-a-
response-to-gov-scott-walker-133887/ [https://perma.cc/UJM9-HPYV].
97. Brown, supra note 20, at 452?53. 
98. McKenzie, supra note 81, at 327 (?Professors do, at times (if not often), exploit tenure by 
shirking their duties in the classroom, in their research, and in their service to their universities.?). 
99. John W. Holley, Tenure and Research Productivity, 6 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 181, 185?90
(1977). 
100. See, e.g., Sharon G. Levin & Paula E. Stephan, Research Productivity Over the Life Cycle: 
Evidence from Academic Scientists, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 114, 126 (1991). 
101. See Michael I. Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication Study: 
Comparisons of Law School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373 (1985). 
102. Id. at 381 tbl.1. 
103. Id.
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fields, a fairly small number of scholars write a disproportionately large fraction 
of the papers.104  But the numbers for senior legal scholars are striking: 297 
scholars, representing just over 10% of this group, accounted for 55% of all 
output.105
To some extent, a decline in productivity with age is a product of a normal 
human life cycle.106  As academics age, they take on more activities outside of 
their academic life.107  As academics age, they often rebalance professional and 
personal needs.108  While an enlightened employer might accommodate or even 
encourage some of these life adjustments, tenure would seem to be an odd 
mechanism for doing so.  Instead of tailoring a remedy to help a faculty member 
through a specific problem, tenure grants a fairly open-ended license for 
professors to substitute away from academic work and towards other priorities, 
if they so choose.109
While teaching is a harder quality to measure than scholarly output, there 
is at least some evidence that tenure may not, as supposed,110 make for better 
teachers.  A study conducted at Northwestern University found that ?contingent 
faculty??non-tenured or non-tenure-track faculty?produced better 
undergraduate learning outcomes in terms of inducing students to take more 
subject courses and do better subsequent coursework than tenured and tenure-
track colleagues.111  The driver for that result?  The bottom quartile of tenured 
and tenure-track teachers provided much less ?value-added? than their 
contingent faculty colleagues.112
104. Paul Ramsden, Describing and Explaining Research Productivity, 28 HIGHER EDUC. 207, 
223 (1994) (?[T]he average publication rate of the Australian academic is low, while its variability is 
high.  Most publications are produced by a small proportion of the total number of staff. . . . These 
findings reflect those reported from other countries.?); Hollis, supra note 60, at 514 (more than half of 
all economists publish zero articles in a given year). 
105. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 101, at 381. 
106. Roger G. Baldwin et al., Faculty in the Middle Years: Illuminating an Overlooked Phase of 
Academic Life, 29 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 97, 106 (2005). 
107. Id. at 104. 
108. Id. at 104?05. 
109. Aloysius Siow, Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia, 14 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 152, 170 (1998) (?Low-powered incentives, including tenure, may at the margin induce 
professors to shirk in their responsibilities.?).
110. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Liang Zhang, Do Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Matter?, 40
J. HUM. RESOURCES 647, 657 (2005). 
111. David N. Figlio et al., Are Tenure Track Professors Better Teachers?, 97 REV. ECON. STAT.
715, 723 (2015). 
112. Id. at 723. 
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B. The Effect of Tenure on Faculty Behavior—Shirking or Fighting 
Tenure also helps create a potentially long-lived group stasis for an 
academic unit.  Moving and changing jobs is expensive, and tenure at least 
ensures a well-paying job in a familiar environment.  Conventional game theory 
would suggest that this would make for a more cooperative group, since 
everyone has to get along for a long time.  As noted in the introduction, 
cooperation games such as the Prisoner?s Dilemma model the elusiveness of 
cooperation; but repetitions of the Prisoner?s Dilemma allow for sanctions for 
non-cooperation and, eventually, coordination.113  Tenure has in fact been 
suggested as a mechanism to increase cooperation, because fighting or shirking 
faculty members must still deal with colleagues, eventually.114
However, it is also possible that with tenure, members of a faculty are just 
stuck with one another.  Because tenure ensures a well-paying, flexible job in a 
familiar environment, even unpopular or unhappy faculty members might be 
induced to stay on.  Weighed against the costs of changing jobs and 
transitioning to a new environment?something not easily undertaken for older 
professors or those with families?professors may choose to stay and tolerate 
mild to moderate levels of unhappiness. 
Tenure also allows discontented faculty to respond to workplace 
unhappiness by avoiding it, or shirking.115  Once it starts, shirking begets 
shirking.116  Many academic units seem to have simply resigned to accepting 
that some of it is endemic to the academic enterprise.117  More benignly, most 
faculty seem to accept that their human colleagues have peaks and valleys in 
their lives, and that outstanding colleagues one year may be shirkers the next, 
and vice versa.118  But when a faculty is chronically contentious, the temptation 
113. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1393. 
114. McKenzie, supra note 81, at 334 (?Tenure is a means of putting some (minimum) limits on 
political infighting.?). 
115. Loraleigh Keashly & Joel H. Neuman, Faculty Experiences with Bullying in Higher 
Education: Causes, Consequences, and Management, 32 ADMIN. THEORY & PRAXIS 48, 54 (2010). 
116. See, e.g., Michael I. Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, The Desirability of Post-Tenure 
Performance Reviews of Law Professors, 15 STETSON L. REV. 355, 367 (1986) (?[I]nactivity breeds 
inactivity.?). 
117. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257, 259 (1948) 
(?[T]he dean has foisted upon his law school a loafer, a lazybones who finds that a modest salary with 
six or eight hours of teaching a week and three months of vacation every summer is the life of his 
dreams, who goes fishing, who plays golf and grows roses, who takes a good long nap every day after 
lunch and two hours for lunch before his nap, and never does anything at all.  There is no law school, 
no matter how distinguished its reputation, that has not numbered on its faculty some such men as 
these. . . . The tragedy is that nothing can ever be done about it.?). 
118. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 116, at 366 (citing examples of family death, divorce, or 
illness as reasons for a break in productivity). 
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is to just avoid faculty life as much as possible, becoming a chronic shirker.119
And again, dismissal of tenured faculty only for adequate cause120 is a high 
standard that is rarely met, thereby licensing shirking.121
Finally, tenure allows faculty to respond to workplace unhappiness not by 
avoiding it, but by antisocial behavior.  Indeed, some have suggested that the 
stasis induced by the granting of tenure just multiplies the opportunities for 
conflict to arise within the faculty.122  Whereas individual faculty may give 
relatively new colleagues the benefit of the doubt, colleagues that have irritated 
each other for years and decades have a way of elevating their disputes, even 
over petty grievances.  Tenure shields much of this behavior, so that irritating 
or offensive behavior is not addressed except in the most egregious cases.123
Venal academic politics is the stuff of lampoon: a widely-cited quip often 
mistakenly attributed to Henry Kissinger holds that ?academic politics is the 
most vicious and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so small.?124
Faculties also fight over less petty matters, such as funding,125 hiring,126
promotion and tenure,127 and teaching loads.128  In the grand scheme of things, 
none of these dramatically affect the material lives of faculty, but they do bear 
heavily on faculty job satisfaction.129  The academy often draws people who 
demand high job satisfaction as their price for salaries is lower than their peers 
119. Keashly & Neuman, supra note 115, at 54. 
120. Brown & Kurland, supra note 86, at 325. 
121. Id. at 328. 
122. Keashly & Neuman, supra note 115, at 53 (?When bullying/mobbing occurs, it tends to be 
long-standing.?); McKenzie, supra note 81, at 339. 
123. One professor who had engaged in a physical altercation with a colleague, and whose 
department colleagues unanimously signed a letter requesting his dismissal, was instead transferred to 
another department. Huang v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1136?37 (4th 
Cir. 1990). 
124. Transcript of Remarks of Henry Kissinger at the 14th Annual John M. Ashbrook Memorial 
Dinner, Ashland University, (Sept. 11, 1997) http://ashbrook.org/events/kissinger-transcript/ 
[https://perma.cc/2VJX-HA7W] (?I formulated the rule that the intensity of academic politics and the 
bitterness of it is in inverse proportion to the importance of the subject . . . ??).  Actually, the original 
observation was first made by political science professor Wallace Stanley Sayre. Allen L. Otten, 
Politics and People, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1973, at 14 (emphasis added). 
125. James C. Hearn & Melissa S. Anderson, Conflict in Academic Departments: An Analysis of 
Disputes Over Faculty Promotion and Tenure, 43 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 503, 507 (2002). 
126. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: 
The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993, 993 (1992) (?[M]y friends and new colleagues 
suggested I write a short article explaining how considerations of race and gender may have figured in 
my own experience . . . .  No fool I, I declined to bite the bait.?).
127. Hearn & Anderson, supra note 125, at 520?21. 
128. Id. at 510. 
129. Brown, supra note 20, at 442. 
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in industry.130  Staying longer in a job may indeed, for people who place a high 
value on job satisfaction, mean they are highly satisfied.  But it could also mean 
that they are engaging in antisocial work behavior.131  The cycle is a vicious 
one, because the response to antisocial work behavior could be to shirk,132
sending the faculty down a spiral of chronic uncollegiality. 
C. The Possibility of Exit 
What might make faculty members more accommodating and tolerant of 
their colleagues?  One possibility, introduced in this article, is that some faculty 
may simply leave.  Some may retire, some may make a lateral move to another 
law school, and some may leave the academic profession entirely.  Lateral 
movement is easier for law professors than it is in other academic disciplines 
that include large setup costs, such as the costs of establishing laboratories with 
expensive equipment.133  Whatever the reason, the stakes and the motivation 
for fighting are greatly lowered if targets of animosity remove themselves from 
the faculty.  
Perhaps even more importantly, the loss of a faculty colleague necessitates 
her replacement.  Faculty appointments are notoriously time-consuming.134
Even after undertaking the effort to replace a departed colleague, there is no 
guarantee that the replacement will be any more pliable than the departed 
colleague.  
With all that in mind, it is easy to see how a moderate amount of faculty 
turnover could be the release valve to diffuse tensions that build up over the 
course of time.  No longer would faculty members simply be stuck with each 
other.  The accumulation of petty insults over time gives way to expedience and 
to a desire to move forward with a modified roster of colleagues.  Perceived 
slights are easier to bear in shorter-term relationships. 
There are limits to turnover as a salve for faculty strife.  Excessive
turnover?so much so that there is no effective way to prevent it?would put 
the faculty right back into the original Prisoner?s Dilemma, with no 
130. Keith A. Bender & John S. Heywood, Job Satisfaction of the Highly Educated: The Role of 
Gender, Academic Tenure, and Earnings, 53 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 253, 259 tbl.1 (2006) (showing 
higher salaries but lower job satisfaction overall and for most categories). 
131. Michelle K. Duffy et al., Positive Affectivity and Negative Outcomes: The Role of Tenure 
and Job Satisfaction, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 950, 952 (1998). 
132. Keashly & Neuman, supra note 115, at 54. 
133. Bruce & Swygert, supra note 20, at 222?23 (noting the interchangeability of positions and 
skills). 
134. Id. at 264. 
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cooperation.135  If the loss of colleagues was inevitable, then there truly would 
be no point in investing in a collegial relationship, and no point in cooperating.  
There is thus some optimal point at which faculty turnover imposes just 
enough discipline so that faculty colleagues will make some effort not to 
unnecessarily alienate their colleagues, but not too much that it becomes 
discouraging.  Some moderate amount of turnover would pose a credible threat 
of exit for some of the faculty members, and help refresh faculty rosters to avoid 
the stasis that fosters conflict.  It is the threat of losing colleagues that keeps 
faculty members in line; actually losing too many of them would simply be 
deflating. 
D. Local Quality of Life  
A higher local quality of life outside of the law school may enhance 
productivity by increasing happiness, but may also represent higher opportunity 
costs for spending time on teaching or scholarship.  Academics, too, grapple 
with work-life balance.136  Counter-intuitively, I hypothesize that a higher local 
quality of life actually leads to a lower amount of time spent on academic affairs 
and, because that could be viewed as shirking by colleagues, would depress 
collegiality.  
Criteria for something as amorphous as ?quality of life? is a fraught 
exercise.  In this article, it is meant as some subjective but measurable quality 
of nonwork life.  Cultural and recreational opportunities, school quality, 
environmental quality, and health outcomes are all factors that influence where 
people choose to live (if they have a choice), and are weighed against 
professional considerations.  But people weigh these factors in wildly different 
ways, giving rise to a plethora of ways to purport to measure ?quality of life.?
Nevertheless, many surveys and studies attempt to rank or rate cities and 
regions for local quality of life, however that is defined, as a response to a 
demand for information about how well people in a place live outside of their 
work lives.137
135. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 2?4. 
136. Jung Cheol Shin & Jisun Jung, Academics Job Satisfaction and Job Stress Across Countries 
in the Changing Academic Environments, 67 HIGHER EDUC. 603, 603?04 (2014). 
137. See, e.g., 2018 Quality of Life Rankings, MERCER (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://mobilityexchange.mercer.com/Portals/0/Content/Rankings/rankings/qol2017e784512/index.ht
ml; Francesca Levy, America’s Most Livable Cities, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/2010/04/29/cities-livable-pittsburgh-lifestyle-real-estate-top-ten-jobs-crime-
income_slide_2.html?thisspeed=25000#161e59646a99 [https://perma.cc/84RK-H69V]; Lianna 
Brinded, The 23 Cities With the Best Quality of Life in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/mercer-2017-quality-of-living-worldwide-city-rankings-2017-3 
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The local quality of life can depress faculty collegiality and cooperation for 
two reasons.  First, cultural and recreational opportunities compete with law 
school callings for an individual faculty member?s time.  If the enjoyment of 
local amenities rises to the level at which it is perceived as to shirking at the 
law school, collegiality and collaboration erode.138  As everyone recognizes, 
academic life is an interactive affair, so that shirking begets shirking.139
Second, a high local quality of life may serve to deter job changes to other law 
schools, causing malcontented faculty members to stay on and either sow 
discontent or put up with it.140  A high local quality of life effectively acts like 
tenure, giving people a reason to settle for a suboptimal work environment. 
It could also be that larger urban areas have more opportunities for 
consulting and other income-generating activity outside of law school.  In the 
Swygert and Gozansky study, faculties that languished in terms of senior 
faculty output were disproportionately located in large urban and governmental 
centers, suggesting that some have chosen to undertake consulting or other 
work.141  Under those circumstances, tensions among faculty would also 
inevitably arise, just as it would with faculty members shirking so they could 
enjoy local amenities.  
It should not be surprising that tenured faculty members strike their work-
life balances differently.  It is almost inevitable that disparities in contribution 
to faculty life emerge.142  It would actually be extraordinary if this were not the 
case, which could explain the pervasiveness of faculty discontent.143
IV. A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
This part sets out a game-theoretic model of cooperation and exit.  The 
model makes the simplifying assumption that players have identical payoffs for 
fighting, cooperating, acquiescing, and leaving.  Of course, preferences are 
heterogeneous among different individual members within a faculty.  A fuller 
model might account for preference heterogeneity, as does one model of marital 
[https://perma.cc/3DRT-XHGD]; 125 Best Places to Live in the USA, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 
20, 2017), https://realestate.usnews.com/places/rankings/best-places-to-live. 
138. See infra tbl.1b. 
139. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 116, at 367. 
140. See infra tbl.1b. 
141. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 101, at 394. 
142. Shin & Jung, supra note 136, at 603?04. 
143. Hearn & Anderson, supra note 125, at 505 (citing J. VICTOR BALDRIDGE, POWER AND 
CONFLICT IN THE UNIVERSITY (1971) (?Baldridge . . . was among the first to highlight [the] 
pervasiveness [of conflict] . . .  in contemporary higher education, but there is evidence that conflict 
has been a part of academic life since ancient times . . . ??). 
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relations.144  This simplified model, however, is sufficient to illustrate the 
narrower assertion made in this article, which is that cooperation could be 
affected by the prospect of exit.  
A. A Hawk-Dove Model of Cooperation 
Consider a simple two-person game-theoretic model of two faculty 
members in an academic unit.145  In figure 1 below, each of two players A and 
B have the choice of ?fighting? (F) or ?cooperating: (C).  By fighting, I mean 
actions within the academic unit that are on net destructive, but advantageous 
to the narrower preferences of the fighter.  For example, a faculty faction could 
argue for hiring more colleagues in their substantive area, or their 
methodological area, such as Law and Economics146 or Critical Legal 
Studies.147  By cooperating, I mean actions that may compromise the narrow 
preferences of the individual members, but on net, serve the interests of the 
academic unit as a whole.  So for example, a faculty faction of Law and 
Economics scholars or Critical Legal Studies scholars may refrain from hiring 
one more of their own to address an agreed-upon need for someone to teach 
Civil Procedure.  Obviously, violent differences of opinion can and do exist 
with respect to what is a ?narrow? interest and what serves the broader interest 
of the academic unit as a whole.  Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies 
scholars could argue sincerely and in good faith that the best interests of the law 
school would be served by hiring one of their own.  It can obviously be difficult 
to distinguish between good faith and self-serving motivations, but it is 
sufficient for purposes of this article to observe that interests conflict along 
these lines, and considerable faculty conflict can occur over these issues.148
144. See, e.g., Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household Decision-Making: 
A Bargaining Analysis, 21 INT?L ECON. REV. 31 (1980) (model of heterogeneous preferences in a 
marital relationship and household decision-making). 
145. Academic units obviously consist of more than two members but the value of this model is 
in illustrating types of responses to types of behavior.  For example, if factions form in a law faculty, 
and are deemed to be pursuing self-serving goals that are viewed by others as being detrimental to the 
institution, then a likely response would be another faction pushing back, or fighting in response to 
fighting.  Likewise, shirking begets more shirking.  There are always some faculty members that are 
willing (or perhaps forced!) to take up the slack left by shirkers, but shirking by some breeds resentment 
that must certainly decrease the amount or quality of work done by the remaining non-shirkers. 
146. Law and Economics is a trans-substantive methodology of analyzing legal doctrine through
economic analyses, drawing heavily on economic efficiency as a normative principle.  For a 
description, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23?28 (6th ed. 2003). 
147. Critical Legal Studies is a trans-substantive methodology for critically analyzing legal 
doctrine and institutions.  For a brief description of Critical Legal Studies, see Mark Tushnet, Critical 
Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984). 
148. Hearn & Anderson, supra note 125, at 504. 
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The most favorable outcome from the group standpoint is C-C, cooperation 
by both A and B.  When individuals work together, their joint work product is 
likely to be greater, or at least more efficiently produced, in comparison with a 
work environment beset by infighting.149  In figure 1, joint cooperation 
produces individual payoffs of 7 each for a group total of 14.  However, if either 
player chooses to fight?over appointments, over promotion or tenure, over 
administrative matters, over anything?then it may garner a slightly higher 
payoff (8), and impose upon the other a lower payoff (4), if the other does not 
retaliate, or fight back.  Fighting and getting the desired outcome is assumed to 
be slightly advantageous for the fighter, but very disadvantageous for the non-
fighter.  While the fighter will get what she wants, it will come at the cost of 
the fighting itself, which is time-consuming.  The non-fighter suffers an 
additional loss in terms of losing some battle over a substantive issue, and 
having the faculty move in a direction inconsistent with her preferences.  
The unambiguously worst outcome is one in which both fight.  Not only 
does nobody get what they want, but time and energy is spent fighting.  Thus, 
fighting as a response to fighting yields an individual payoff even lower than 
that of cooperating. 
As depicted, this is a ?Hawk-Dove? game, also known as a ?game of 
chicken.?150  The paradigmatic story used to illustrate this game is one in which 
two teenage boys drive a car at a high speed at each other, and the party that 
swerves to avoid a collision is deemed to have ?lost.?151  This game form 
illustrates the fragility of cooperation and the advantages of aggression.152
149. See sources cited supra note 15.
150. TODD SANDLER, ECONOMIC CONCEPTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 43?44 (2001). 
151. Id. at 44. 
152. Id. at 43?44. 
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There are no stable equilibria in this game, although both of the outcomes F-C 
(A fights, B cooperates) and C-F (A cooperates, B fights) are Nash equilibria.153
If the game is repeated, as it is in academic units, one would expect that 
neither Nash equilibrium persists for very long; A and B may take turns 
fighting, but periodic forays of aggression by either A or B are punished by 
retaliation by fighting back, with the result that the parties should be pulled 
back into the C-C equilibrium.154  For most academic units, all four states exist 
at different points in time, albeit to widely varying degrees. 
The puzzle is why academic units seem caught in the unfortunate and 
unproductive F-F (both fight) state for long periods of time.  Over time, it could 
be that a faculty member or faction could be ?punished? in some modest way 
short of dismissal, such as smaller pay raises, undesirable teaching schedules, 
or unpleasant administrative duties.  Such punishment could be enough to 
induce cooperation and draw faculties into the C-C outcome.  This game is 
static to illustrate relationships between faculty members.  The reality is 
dynamic, involving different states at different times.155
But then why does faculty fighting persist?156  For one thing, because of 
tenure, the modest punishments available for antisocial behavior may be too 
low to deter such behavior.  Much antisocial behavior can be couched in terms 
of long-term institutional interest, and it is far from straightforward to 
distinguish self-serving arguments from genuine institutional concern.157  With 
a high bar for adequate cause,158 faculty can engage in all but the most offensive 
behavior in faculty conflict.  There is thus little, at least in the form of formal 
sanctions, to deter faculty members from fighting.  
In addition, faculty members have at their disposal one other unproductive 
response to conflict, also discussed above, and also enabled by the tenure 
system: shirking.159 Of course, there are also differences of opinion on what 
constitutes shirking,  but again, just about every professor would acknowledge 
that this exists broadly in just about every unit.160  In this model, shirking could 
be the offloading of administrative work, or lower productivity in terms of 
teaching or scholarship.  
153. A Nash equilibrium is an outcome in which one player?s strategy is optimal given the other 
player?s action. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 8?12. 
154. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1393. 
155. Id. at 1392. 
156. See, e.g., Hearn & Anderson, supra note 143, at 505. 
157. Id.
158. See McKenzie, supra note 81, at 325. 
159. Id. at 327. 
160. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 117, at 259. 
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In this model, I conflate fighting and shirking.  That is to say, shirking yields 
the same payoffs as fighting, both for the fighter/shirker, and the other player.  
It is true that shirking and fighting inconvenience colleagues in different ways.  
I posit that they are roughly comparable in terms of the degree of harm.  A 
fighting colleague certainly makes life unpleasant.  But so does shirking, as it 
sows resentment, requiring others to pick up the slack institutionally.161  As for 
the fighter/shirker, it is rarely pleasant to be engaged in faculty conflict.  Nor is 
it pleasant, even if one could do so without formal sanction, to have disengaged 
from the workplace, for many the most reliable and steady source of social 
interactions.162
B. The Possibility of Exit 
This simple Hawk-Dove model omits an important third option for some 
faculty members: the possibility of exit.  Exit can be a lateral move to another 
institution, to another job, or into retirement.  In the absence of fighting or 
shirking, exit is costly, as moving to another institution and another city is time-
consuming and stressful.  But if there is fighting or shirking, exit provides an 
alternative to fighting and being mired in the F-F outcome.  In Fig. 2 below, 
exit is modeled as a superior outcome for B, the exiting faculty member, if her 
colleagues are fighters.  Moving is costly and time-consuming, so even if B is 
heading for a more cooperative faculty, it would not be quite as good as staying 
put in a cooperative faculty.  But it would be better than staying put in an 
uncooperative faculty.  
Colleagues left behind are worse off, even after the loss of their nemesis.  
They must now take the time replace their colleague, and there is no guarantee 
that the replacement will be any better, either in terms of productivity or 
agreeability.  After all, at some point the departed colleague either chose or was 
chosen in an appointments process in which faculty get to choose their 
colleagues.  For colleagues left behind, I assume that their payoff is the same 
as fighting. 
161. See, e.g., Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 101, at 381. 
162. ?Social capital? is the term given to strong, mutually beneficial relationships with people.  
Workplace social capital is the term used to describe the strength and extent of social relations at the 
workplace.  Low workplace social capital has been associated with poorer physical and mental health. 
See, e.g., Anne Kouvonen et al., Low Workplace Social Capital as a Predictor of Depression: The 
Finnish Public Sector Study, 167 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1143, 1148 (2008); Etsuji Suzuki et al., Does 
Low Workplace Social Capital Have Detrimental Effect on Workers’ Health?, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED.
1367, 1369 (2010). 
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This possibility of B?s exit destabilizes the Nash equilibrium F-C (A fights 
and B cooperates).  If B can exit, A?s dominant strategy is to cooperate.  
Knowing that, B?s dominant strategy is thus to fight.  A stable Nash equilibrium 
is thus C-F (A cooperates, B fights).  This represents the existence of some 
leeway (within limits, of course) that are granted to those who have the 
possibility of exit.  
What if A also has a possibility of exit?  The game must then be modified 
further to account for that option available to A.  This is shown in Fig. 3 below. 
Fig. 3
  B  
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A
F 3  3 8  4 3  5
C 4  8 7  7 3  5 
E 5  3 5  3  
What the symmetrical exit option does is make cooperation the dominant 
strategy for those not exiting.  If both players have the exit option, then 
cooperation becomes the dominant strategy for both.  C-C becomes a stable 
equilibrium.  However, C-C is only a stable equilibrium if there is the realistic 
possibility of exit.  Apart from retirement, exit is only possible for faculty 
members who are productive.  
What the possibility of symmetrical exit introduces is a disciplining effect
on a faculty that might otherwise be inclined to conflict or shirking.  Even 
shirkers might be induced to shirk less, because if too many of their colleagues 
depart, their institution will eventually shrink, and ultimately, they might be 
called upon to do some work! 
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It is also important to notice another implication of this model: that exit, if 
possible, need not be exercised in order to act as a disciplining force.  As noted 
above, it is the threat of exit that keeps would-be bickering faculty in line; if 
that threat is carried out, then the deterrent effect is lost.  In this model, exit is 
possible but not inevitable. 
C. Summarization of Assumptions 
To summarize, this model makes and depends upon the following 
assumptions: 
Assumption 1: Fighting when the other is cooperating (i.e., not 
fighting) produces a slightly higher individual payoff for the fighter, but 
the group payoff is lower.  While fighting produces some individual 
satisfaction, the effort to obtain it is costly.  Fighting is commonly observed in 
academic units, so there must be some individual utility involved.  For the non-
fighting cooperator, the outcome is clearly worse as compared to a cooperative 
C-C outcome.  Without her consent, some change has occurred in the academic 
unit that conflicts with her academic life or academic vision.  In that same vein, 
the lack of cooperation suppresses productivity and collegiality.  Academic 
fighting is assumed to be a negative sum game.  This is also true if instead of 
fighting, shirking occurs.  Group outputs are lower, because non-shirkers are 
left to carry more of the administrative load, displacing productivity and 
reducing collegiality.  
Assumption 2: For the short term, cooperating as a response to fighting 
produces a higher individual payoff than that of fighting back.  Fighting 
back (or shirking back) may, over the long term, discipline fighting or shirking, 
but not in the short term.  While voting rules and governance procedures in 
faculties vary widely, academic units depend on comity for cohesiveness and 
for the generation of the knowledge spillovers so crucial to the productiveness 
of an academic unit.  Mutual fighting is thus assumed to be an unproductive 
stalemate.  Cooperation (or rather, in the face of fighting, capitulation) is thus 
preferable, because at least it saves on the time and effort spent fighting. 
Assumption 3: Exit as a response to fighting, for those who are able 
and inclined to exit, produces an individual payoff that is better than either 
fighting back or cooperating.  Not everyone can exit, but for those who can, 
exit holds out the prospect of moving laterally to an academic unit that has less 
fighting or shirking, or has more resources and benefits.  While moving is 
costly, the payoff of a prospective stream of cooperative outcomes over time 
may outweigh the transition costs. 
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Assumption 4: Exit is a poor outcome for those left behind.  Replacing 
a lost colleague is always costly.  There is always the possibility that a lost 
colleague can be replaced by someone better, but there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in the hiring process.  
D. Summarization of Hypotheses 
This game-theoretic model, as all games do, only illustrates why certain 
states might exist relative to others.  Whether they do or not is clearly more 
complicated than the stylized payoffs of a game could explain.  The thesis of 
this article is to explain why some law faculties exist in some states and not 
others.  I advance two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Up to a point, the greater the threat of exit, the greater 
the likelihood for cooperation.  If there is too great a probability of exit, then 
cooperation suffers, as the original Prisoner?s Dilemma game illustrates.  But 
up to a point, the threat of exit keeps faculty members cooperative. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher local quality of life will lead to lower cooperation. 
Using indices generated by the Gallup polling organization and by the Centers 
for Disease Control (and modified by economic researchers), I hypothesize that 
the higher the quality of life index, the lower the level of cooperation. 
V. DATA AND RESULTS
A. Data 
U.S. law schools are extremely sensitive to external indices, most notably 
the rankings published annually by U.S. News & World Report (USNW).163  It 
is no exaggeration, and a constant lament on the part of American law 
professors, that USNW rankings are the single greatest determinant for a large 
variety of important outcomes, such as job placements, starting salaries for 
graduates, and faculty productivity.164  That is the reality of life in American 
law schools.  
But within this very hierarchical ecosystem, variation exists.  Among 
similarly situated law schools, some faculties are more cooperative than others, 
some more productive than others, and some experience greater faculty 
turnover than others.  This article seeks to tie together these and other factors 
in this empirical study on faculty collegiality and cooperation.  While these two 
163. Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings. 
164. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, 
and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229 (2006). 
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dependent variables are not one and the same, they both measure to some extent 
the intellectual health of a faculty.  
It is true, of course, that the raison d’etre of every law school, even Yale, 
is legal instruction.  But since it is extremely difficult to measure quality of 
instruction, and since there is no evidence that quality of instruction affects 
tangible outcomes such as placement success or graduate starting salary levels, 
it seems futile to try and measure it.  The analysis does, however, take account 
of the highly variable need of law schools for attentiveness to teaching, so that 
law schools that emphasize teaching are not coded as ?unproductive? or 
?uncollegial,? just because they respond rationally to the tyranny of USNW 
rankings.  This article seeks to address this question: Given the external 
demands placed on law schools, what are some of the causal mechanisms of 
faculty cooperativeness? 
This article challenges the notion that faculty turnover, by itself, is a sign 
of ill health.  In fact, up to a certain point, beyond which turnover is excessive 
and demoralizing, more turnover begets more cooperation.  To the extent that 
tenure depresses faculty turnover, it may contribute to unproductive or 
uncooperative behavior.  
1. Survey of Law Professors 
I administered a survey via email of law professors in U.S. law schools in 
May and June of 2014.  Email addresses were obtained from the directory of 
law professors published by the Association of American Law Schools.  The 
survey asked respondents to self-report a number of things, most importantly 
faculty collegiality.  Faculty respondents were asked to rate their faculty, on a 
scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the worst and 10 being the best, on their faculty?s
collegiality.  They were also asked to estimate the amount of time, in an average
week, smoothing out over the course of the year,165 they spent on: (i) teaching, 
(ii) scholarship, and (iii) administrative matters.  The survey instrument also 
asked respondents for a number of personal factors: age, years in the legal 
academy, relationship status, number of children, and their own subjective 
evaluation of their extra-academic quality of life.  Lastly, respondents were 
asked to identify their law school. 
The survey generated 750 responses, about 35% of those opening the email 
containing the survey solicitation.  Those actually receiving and opening the 
email constituted about 20% of all active legal personnel listed in the AALS 
faculty directories.  Not all of these entries, however, represent tenure-tracked 
165. Respondents were asked to smooth out their workload over the course of a year, to account 
for the natural academic fluctuations over a calendar year: more teaching during the academic year, 
more scholarship over the summer. 
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professors or instructors, and the 750 responses yielded roughly 555 usable 
responses.  Additional surveys missing responses to key questions were also 
unusable for some regressions.  For this article, only tenure-track professors, 
Deans, and tenure-track Vice Deans and Associate Deans were included. 
2. Cooperation 
One measure of cooperation used in this study is thus the collegiality self-
reported by professors in the survey instrument from 1 to 10.  It is true that 
collegiality is not the same thing as cooperativeness.  However, collegiality is 
an important precursor to cooperation.166  Faculty colleagues must be collegial 
enough to interact and extend social graces to each other in order to cooperate 
and take on the more challenging tasks of testing each other?s ideas. 
I also measured research cooperation by counting the number of co-
authored articles, published in secondary sources?U.S. law journals?
included in the Hein Online database, from 2005 to 2013, inclusive, by two or 
more professors from the same law school.  The goal of cooperation leading to 
collaboration is to produce co-authored articles.  That ideal outcome is not 
always attained, but is an objective indicator of the extent of collaboration 
within a law faculty.  I utilize a measure that accounts for variations in faculty 
size: the rate of co-authorship, the number of co-authored articles divided by 
the average number of faculty members. 
3. Faculty Turnover 
Faculty turnover was measured by consulting the AALS faculty directories 
and manually counting, year by year and law school by law school, the number 
of new entrants and exits (including retirements) in each year for every law 
school, from 2005 to 2013.167
There are two different ways of operationalizing faculty turnover: the 
number of changes in faculty composition, which would include both newly 
hired professors as well as losses to retirement and lateral moves; or just the 
number of losses.  The former might measure the level of disruption 
accompanying either new hires or losses.  The latter view might consider new 
hires a happy occasion, so that only the disutilities of losing a colleague are 
worth worrying about.  Along a second dimension, in considering the 
166. David N. Laband & Robert D. Tollison, Intellectual Collaboration, 108 J. POLIT. ECON.
632 (2000); João R. Faria et al., Human Capital, Collegiality, and Stardom in Economics: Empirical 
Analysis, 106 SCIENTOMETRICS 917 (2016); Sandra Jones et al., Distributed Leadership: A 
Collaborative Framework for Academics, Executives and Professionals in Higher Education, 34 J. 
HIGHER EDUC. POL?Y & MGMT. 67 (2012); Mary Frank Fox, Publication Productivity Among 
Scientists, 13 SOC. STUD. SCI. 285 (1983). 
167. One year, 2009, was missing, during which the AALS failed to publish a directory. 
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magnitude of the change, turnover might be either the absolute number of 
changes or losses (depending on which is used), or the number of changes or 
losses as a fraction of the total faculty.  The former might measure the absolute 
amount of work needed to adjust, while the latter might measure the work of 
adjustment spread out over the entire faculty.  Four different measures were 
thus tested for turnover over the eight-year study period:  
(i) the total number of faculty losses, or “losses,”
(ii) the total number of faculty losses plus new hires, or “gains+losses,”
(iii) the faculty losses as a fraction of the faculty size,168 or “loss rate,” and  
(iv) the total losses plus new-hires as a percentage of the average total 
faculty members, or “gain+loss rate.”.
4. Resources 
In the hierarchical world of U.S. law schools, rankings determine the 
amount of resources devoted to all manner of faculty work.  Lower-ranked law 
schools have higher teaching loads, and fewer resources to support scholarship, 
such as travel budgets, library support, and supplemental instruction.169  The 
hypotheses in this research posit that within the rankings, there is variation 
among similarly situated law schools, and that this variation can be partially 
explained by the factors explored in this article?faculty turnover and local 
quality of life.  But given the disparities between have and have-not law 
schools, it is necessary, when considering collegiality to control for status in 
the rankings, as a proxy for its resources.  Different measures used by USNW 
Report are employed to control for this source of disparities.  USNW overall 
scores, peer scores, lawyer-and-judge scores, and academic ranking are tested 
for significance, as well as a supplemental ranking system was developed by 
University of Chicago Professor Brian Leiter and University of St. Thomas 
Professor Gregory Sisk (hereinafter the Leiter?Sisk index).170
168. Faculty size was averaged over the eight-year period. 
169. For 2017, the top quartile of law schools with valid data on per-student expenditures 
averaged $59,272 per student; the bottom quartile averaged $29,175.  Harvard, Yale, Stanford and 
Columbia averaged $104,938 per student. 
170. The Leiter?Sisk index provides a ranking and citation count for the top ninety-seven law 
schools.  I filled in the bottom-ranked half of law schools with a value slightly more than half of the 
lowest-scored law school.  I developed this by graphing the Leiter?Sisk scores from top to bottom, and 
estimating the best fitting straight line extending out beyond the end of lowest scored law schools, and 
taking the average values along that fitted line.  While the lowest reported law school in the Leiter?
Sisk index had 177 citations in the relevant period, I estimated the average citation count for the bottom 
half, unreported law schools, would be ninety-nine.  
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Direct measures are available as well, albeit through the highly filtered law 
school-reported expenditures that are part of the USNW rankings pretense.  
USNW reports expenditures per student for instruction, library, and support, 
and also their expenditures per student for financial aid.171  USNW also ranks 
law schools by faculty resources, but does not provide a dollar figure, as it does 
for student resources (instruction, library, support, financial aid).172  Individual 
respondents to the law professor survey were also asked to rate their law 
school?s support of teaching, scholarship, and service, respectively. 
5. Local Quality of Life 
The second hypothesis of this article is that local quality of life places a 
competing claim on faculty members? time, and detracts from cooperation.  I 
collected location-specific indices of local quality of life for the locations of all 
U.S. law schools.  One source of data was derived from surveys conducted by 
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), under its Behavioral Risk Factors 
Surveillance System (BRFSS).173  BRFSS surveys ask respondents a large 
number of health and well-being questions, including the question: In general, 
How satisfied are you with your life?174  The question is meant to measure the 
respondent?s subjective well-being, so some vagueness is intentional and 
purposeful.175  This data is also modified in a study by economists Edward 
Glaeser, Joshua Gottlieb, and Oren Ziv,176 which grouped respondents by 
metropolitan statistical area, and also adjusted raw happiness scores by 
demographics and by demographics and income.  Those three measures?raw 
BRFSS happiness scores, BRFSS scores adjusted for demographics, and 
BRFSS scores adjusted for demographics and income?were then assigned to 
each law school based on their location.  Some law schools are not located in 
any metropolitan statistical area.  The Glaeser et al. study also separated out 
and estimated happiness for respondents living in a non-metropolitan area.177
That applied, for example, to Grundy, Virginia (the home for the Appalachian 
171. Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2019 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 19, 2018, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/articles/law-schools-methodology. 
172. Id.
173. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Unhappy Cities 5 (Nat?l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper 20291, 2014). 
174. Id. at 5. 
175. Id. at 6. 
176. See generally Glaeser et al., supra note 173.  I am grateful to the authors, who shared their 
compilation of their raw data in statistical metropolitan areas, along with their adjustments to the raw 
data. 
177. Id. at 15. 
2018] A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 31 
School of Law), Urbana-Champaign, Illinois (the home of the University of 
Illinois College of Law), and Moscow, Idaho (the University of Idaho College 
of Law). 
A second source of data for location-specific, local quality of life was 
derived from a long-running Gallup poll asking respondents to evaluate their 
city or town.178  Since the Gallup poll has been conducted for decades, their 
results do not map perfectly onto current Census metropolitan statistical areas, 
and there is no category of non-metropolitan places in each state, as there was 
in Glaeser et al.  For law schools not in one of these Gallup-defined 
metropolitan statistical areas, I selected the nearest Gallup-defined 
metropolitan area, usually within-state, as a measure for quality of life in the 
law school location.  For example, Valparaiso Law School, in Valparaiso, 
Indiana was coded as South Bend, the same location as Notre Dame, one hour 
away.  Of course, there is bound to be some imprecision in this exercise. 
To summarize, five different measures were tested for the location-specific 
measures of the quality of life, denoted as D:
(i) the raw BRFSS happiness scores for metropolitan statistical areas, or 
“CDC happiness”;
(ii) those BRFSS raw happiness scores adjusted for demographic 
characteristics, by Glaeser et al., or “CDC happiness+dem”;
(iii) those BRFSS raw happiness scores adjusted for both demographic 
characteristics and income, also by Glaeser et al., or “CDC 
happiness+dem+inc”;
(iv) Gallup scores in the 2013 Gallup poll of satisfaction with the City 179
or “Gallup satisfaction”; and 
(v) Gallup scores in the 2011 Gallup poll of city well-being, 180 a weighted 
index that combines self-reported perceptions of well-being and several 
health metrics, such as location-specific incidences of obesity and exercise 
frequency, or “Gallup health.”
178. Rebecca Riffkin, City Satisfaction Highest in Fort Collins-Loveland, Colo., GALLUP (Apr. 
11, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/168485/city-satisfaction-highest-fort-collins-loveland-
colo.aspx [https://perma.cc/57QN-FM8U] (showing responses to question: Are you satisfied with the 
city or area in which you live?). 
179. Id.
180. Dan Witters, U.S. University Towns Score High on Well-being, GALLUP (Mar. 5, 2012),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/153095/University-Towns-Score-High-Wellbeing.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/M8UC-NCRH]. 
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B. Results  
Tables 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b report results of regressions using the two different 
dependent variables for cooperation?self-reported collegiality and co-
authorship rate?and the two different independent variables, faculty turnover 
and local quality of life.  Tables 1a and 1b, using the individual respondent as 
the unit of observation, use self-reported collegiality as the dependent variable.  
Table 1a shows the results of models using different measures of faculty 
turnover, and Table 1b shows the results of models using different measures of 
local quality of life.  Because self-reported collegiality is an ordinal variable 
from 1 to 10, the regressions in tables 1a and 1b are ordered probit.181
Similarly, tables 2a and 2b, using the law school as the unit of observation, 
set forth the results of regressions of co-authorship rate against, respectively, 
different measures of a) faculty turnover, and b) local quality of life indicators.  
Because a number of law schools had zero internal co-authorships over the 
eight-year study period, the dependent variable is left-censored,182 so the 
regressions shown in tables 2a and 2b are tobit.183
The purpose of the regressions reported in table 1a is to determine which 
measure of faculty turnover is the most statistically significant.  The most 
statistically significant measure of faculty turnover is then incorporated in the 
models in table 1b.  The purpose of the regressions reported in table 1b is to 
determine which measure of local quality of life is the most statistically 
significant.  So, in turn, the most statistically significant measure of local 
quality of life is incorporated into the models in table 1a.  
As noted above, law schools are very heterogeneous in terms of resources, 
and thus potentially biased in terms of how faculty members might cooperate 
or collaborate.184  Also discussed above, a plethora of measures could act as a 
control variable.185  Of all of these, the USNW Report overall score, averaged 
over the years 2009?2014, turned out to be the most consistently statistically 
181. Ordered probit models are models estimating the relationship between continuous 
independent variables and dependent variables that are ?discrete,? meaning they can only take on one 
of several ordered, ranked values.  This is typical for survey data, in which respondents are asked to 
express the strength of their preferences on a scale. See, e.g., RUSSELL DAVIDSON & JAMES 
MACKINNON, ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE IN ECONOMETRICS 529?31 (1993). 
182. ?Censored? data is data that cannot take on certain values, like a dependent variable that 
must be greater than zero, which may mask over that omitted range a statistical relationship with an 
independent variable. See, e.g., GEORGE P. JUDGE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ECONOMETRICs 796?97 (2d ed. 1988). 
183. Tobit models are those which estimate relationships between continuous independent 
variables and continuous but censored dependent variables. Id. at 795?97. 
184. See supra section V.A.4. 
185. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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significant measure to control for ranking effects.  Also, as it turns out, self-
reported measures of how much a law school supports scholarship is a very 
strong determinant of self-reported collegiality.186
As noted above, the hypothesis is that up to a certain point, higher turnover 
produces higher cooperativeness.  In some law schools, turnover is so high that 
it is demoralizing to the faculty left behind.187  Replacing departed faculty is 
time-consuming, so the constant loss of colleagues places real time constraints 
on cooperation in teaching or scholarship.  That is the more familiar story of 
faculty turnover: that it is either a signal of internal strife or that it is a pure loss 
to those remaining.  It is quite possible that at very high levels of turnover, self-
reported collegiality could suffer.  
What is that certain point?  It is hard to know, without any a priori notions 
of how much turnover is too much.  To determine an appropriate threshold, I 
performed iterative regressions with a view towards finding the optimal value 
of the pseudo-R2.188  I regressed co-authorship and separately, self-reported 
collegiality, and iteratively dropped law schools with high turnover rates, 
gradually reducing the threshold above which law schools, and faculty 
respondents from the law schools, are dropped from the data set.  Going through 
this process, I arrived at a threshold level of about 42% for both sets of 
regressions.  For both sets of regressions, the predictive power of the model 
drops off if one includes law schools with turnover rates higher than this rate.  
For the self-reported collegiality model this results in the discard of thirty-five 
observations from twenty law schools.  Thus, from the co-authorship model, 
this resulted in the discard of twenty law schools.  That turnover rate translates 
into the loss of almost half of faculty over the eight-year study period. 
All models included a dummy variable for married faculty members.  
Married faculty tend to be more productive than unmarried faculty members,189
though female faculty members with children tend to assume more 
responsibility for child-raising, and hence enjoy less of a productivity bump 
over unmarried female faculty.190  All models in tables 1a and 1b also include 
co-authorship rates for the respondent?s law school.  In theory, self-reported 
collegiality should correlate with co-authorship. 
186. See infra tbl.1a.
187. See supra section IV.A. 
188. JUDGE, supra note 182, at 794. 
189. Barry Bozeman & Monica Gaughan, Job Satisfaction Among University Faculty: 
Individual, Work, and Institutional Determinants, 82 J. HIGHER EDUC. 154, 159 (2011). 
190. Mary Frank Fox, Gender, Family Characteristics, and Publication Productivity Among 
Scientists, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 131, 136 (2005); Linda J. Sax et al., Faculty Research Productivity: 
Exploring the Role of Gender and Family-Related Factors, 43 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 423, 431 tbl.3 
(2002). 
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To summarize, the variables included in these models are: 
? Respondents? rating of law school support for scholarship: scholarship 
support;
? USNW overall score averaged from 2009 to 2014: USNW 2009?2014 
overall;191
? Number of articles co-authored by professors within the same law 
school, from 2005?2013, divided by the average faculty size: co-
authorship rate;192
? Respondents? rating of faculty collegiality: self-reported 
collegiality;193
? Respondents? marital status: married;
? Number of faculty losses from 2005?2013: losses;
? Number of faculty additions plus losses from 2005?2013: 
gains+losses;
? Number of faculty losses divided by average faculty size from 2005?
2013: loss rate;
? Number of faculty additions plus losses divided by average faculty size 
from 2005?2013: gain+loss rate;
? Raw happiness scores from the CDC BRFSS survey, for metropolitan 
statistical areas, or “CDC happiness”;
? Raw CDC BRFSS happiness scores adjusted for demographic 
characteristics, by Glaeser et al., or “CDC happiness+dem”;
? Raw CDC BRFSS happiness scores adjusted for both demographic 
characteristics and income, by Glaeser et al., or “CDC 
happiness+dem+inc”;
? 2013 Gallup poll scores of city satisfaction, or “Gallup satisfaction”;
and 
? 2013 Gallup poll scores of city well-being, an index that combines 
several self-reported perceptions of well-being and health, or “Gallup 
health.”
191. When employed as an independent variable in table 1a in which the unit of observation is 
the respondent, it is the USNW average overall score for 2009?2014 for the respondent?s law school. 
192. When employed as an independent variable in table 1a in which the unit of observation is 
the respondent, it is the co-authorship rate of the respondent?s law school. 
193. When employed as an independent variable in table 1b in which the unit of observation is 
the individual law school, it is the average of self-reported collegiality ratings of respondents from the 
law school. 
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1. Self-reported Collegiality 
Tables 1a and 1b show different models for respondents? self-reported 
collegiality.  As acknowledged above, collegiality is not the same thing as 
cooperation.  However, obtaining self-reported data is almost certainly a better 
temperature-taking of a faculty than most other indices that could be 
constructed. 
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Table 1a 
Self-reported collegiality ? faculty turnover measures 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
scholarship 
support 
0.316*** 
(13.19) 
0.318*** 
(13.26) 
0.316*** 
(13.18) 
0.318*** 
(13.27) 
0.321*** 
(13.41) 
0.321*** 
(13.42) 
USNW 2009?
2014 overall  
-0.011*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.012*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.014*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.014*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.014*** 
(-4.46) 
co-authorship 
rate
0.678 
(1.56) 
0.667 
(1.54) 
0.675 
(1.56) 
0.669 
(1.54) 
0.614 
(1.42) 
0.612 
(1.42) 
married 0.195* 
(1.74) 
0.198* 
(1.77) 
0.199* 
(1.77) 
0.203* 
(1.81) 
0.195 
(1.75) 
0.199* 
(1.78) 
losses 0.020* 
(1.85) 
0.025** 
(2.29) 
gains+losses 0.007 
(1.13) 
loss rate 0.865 
(1.47) 
1.238** 
(2.17) 
gain+loss rate  0.023 
(0.72) 
Gallup 
satisfaction  
-0.029** 
(-2.14) 
-0.026** 
(-2.00) 
-0.029** 
(-2.17) 
-0.027** 
(-2.10) 
CDC
happiness 
-1.172 
(-1.60) 
-1.110 
(-1.52) 
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Pseudo R2 0.0885 0.0892 0.0888 0.0898 0.0888 0.0898 
   
z values in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1
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The local quality of life measure used for models 1 through 4 was the 
Gallup index for city satisfaction, or Gallup satisfaction.  Only one of the 
measures for faculty turnover is statistically significant, and only at the 90% 
level.  However, it is worth noting that the overall fit of these models was poorer 
than that of models 5 and 6, which use a different measure for local quality of 
life, CDC happiness.
For either set of specifications, the most statistically significant measure of 
turnover was the pure number of faculty losses suffered over the eight-year 
period, losses.  One might have hypothesized that the turnover should be 
adjusted for faculty size, or loss rate, the number of faculty losses divided by 
the faculty size.194  But as in other model specifications not reported here, this 
was not the case, suggesting that it is not necessarily more meaningful for a 
small faculty to lose a colleague than a large one.  
Respondents? self-reported law school support for scholarship (scholarship 
support) is clearly the most statistically significant and robust variable.  That 
was true in almost all of the model specifications I tested.  That it should boost 
collegiality is not surprising.  The greater availability of resources should make 
it easier for faculty to cooperate.  
The U.S. News & World ranking, averaged from 2009 to 2014 (USNW
2009?2014 overall), the most statistically significant of several similar indices, 
was also consistently statistically significant, but in the opposite direction that 
I expected.  As one climbs the U.S. News & World rankings ladder, respondents 
reported less collegiality.  That is surprising because insofar as rankings are a 
proxy for resource abundance, it is surprising that more is less.  Why this should 
be the case is open for interpretation, but it could be that the higher-ranked the 
law school, the more demanding faculty members are for greater job 
satisfaction, and more disappointed they are.  Studies of job satisfaction suggest 
that higher educated persons actually have lower job satisfactions.195  If that 
somehow maps onto law professors, then this outcome might be less surprising. 
Marital status (married) was statistically significant in almost all model 
specifications.  Why would married faculty report higher collegiality than 
unmarried faculty, and even those that reported being in a relationship or a civil 
union?196  A fair amount of psychological research now strongly suggests that 
statistically speaking, married persons are more likely to report higher levels of 
194. The measure was the average of the faculty size over the eight-year period. 
195. Bender & Heywood, supra note 130, at 253. 
196. In response to the survey question on marital status, respondents could respond that they 
were: (1) married; (2) single, (3) in a relationship, or (4) other, including a legally recognized civil 
union. 
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happiness197 and other measures of subjective well-being.198  Married faculty 
generally report higher job satisfaction,199 so it seems likely that they would 
report higher collegiality.200
Finally, table 1a provides some evidence for both of the hypotheses, but not 
at the same time.  The statistical effects are quite small, and much smaller than 
the robustly significant scholarship support and USNW 2009?2014,
suggesting that the effects of turnover are small compared to other factors, but 
significant.  
Table 1b replicates most of the findings from table 1a, including those 
pertaining to the two hypotheses advanced in this article: that a statistically 
significant relationship exists between self-reported collegiality and either
faculty turnover or location-specific indicators, but not both at the same time.  
Either Gallup satisfaction is statistically significant, or losses are statistically 
significant, but not both.  It is also worth noting that models with a different 
measure of local quality of life, CDC happiness, provided an overall slightly 
better fit. 
In both sets of models, co-authorship rate was not statistically significant.  
It would not appear that co-authorship itself necessarily led to higher feelings 
of collegiality.  
197. See, e.g., Walter R. Gove et al., Does Marriage Have Positive Effects on the Psychological 
Well-Being of the Individual?, 24 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 122, 126 (1983); Anke C. Zimmermann 
& Richard A. Easterlin, Happily Ever After? Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Happiness in 
Germany, 32 POP. & DEV. REV. 511, 511 (2006) (?There is a comfortable consensus in the social 
sciences that marriage has a positive and enduring effect on well-being . . . ??).
198. ?Subjective well-being? is a term that has been developed in the social sciences, most 
notably in Psychology, to describe a wider panoply of feelings associated with happiness, or what 
people are observed to prefer.  For a discussion, see Ed Diener, The Remarkable Changes in the Science 
of Subjective Well-Being, 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 663 (2013). 
199. Bozeman & Gaughan, supra note 189, at 159?60. 
200. The causality could run in the other direction: just as it is possible that happier people are 
more likely to be married, it is possible that the respondents reporting higher levels of collegiality 
might be more likely to be married. See, e.g., Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Does Marriage Make 
People Happy, or Do Happy People Get Married?, 35 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 326, 342 (2006). 
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Table 1b 
Self-reported collegiality ? location-specific quality of life measures 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
scholarship 
support 
0.321*** 
(13.42) 
0.321*** 
(13.45) 
0.321*** 
(13.44) 
0.318*** 
(13.27) 
0.318*** 
(13.27) 
USNW 2009?
2014 overall  
0.0150*** 
(-4.46) 
0.0115*** 
(-4.50) 
0.0152*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.0138*** 
(-4.02) 
0.0140*** 
(-4.13) 
co-authorship 
rate
0.612 
(1.42) 
0.628 
(1.45) 
0.635 
(1.47) 
0.668 
(1.54) 
0.710 
(1.63) 
married 0.199* 
(1.78) 
0.193* 
(1.73) 
0.192* 
(1.72) 
0.203* 
(1.77) 
0.206* 
(1.84) 
losses  0.025** 
(2.29) 
0.026** 
(2.33) 
0.025** 
(2.33) 
0.020* 
(1.85) 
0.025** 
(2.34) 
CDC happiness -1.110 
(-1.52) 
CDC happiness 
+dem  
-0.674 
(-0.89) 
CDC happiness 
+dem+inc 
-1.108 
(-1.03) 
Gallup 
satisfaction 
-0.0275** 
(-2.10) 
Gallup health -0.044* 
(-1.81) 
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 
Pseudo R2 0.0898 0.0881 0.0883 0.0887 0.0897 
z values in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1 
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2. Co-authorship Rate 
Self-reported collegiality is one measure of propensity to cooperate.  A 
more objective indicator might measure actual cooperation: articles co-
authored with colleagues in the same faculty, divided by the number of faculty 
averaged over 2005?2013, co-authorship rate, is used as a dependent variable.  
Note that in tables 1a and 1b, the unit of observation was the individual 
respondent, and externally collected law school data was imputed to each 
respondent (who reported his or her law school).  In tables 2a and 2b, the 
process is reversed: the unit of observation is the law school, and survey data 
about the law school from respondents is imputed to each law school.  So for 
example, self-reported collegiality for a law school is taken by an average of all 
of the respondents from that law school.  Law schools with no individual 
respondents at all (32) were dropped.  As noted above,201 many law schools had 
no co-authorships over the study period, effectively left-censoring the data, so 
the regressions in tables 2a and 2b are tobit. 
201. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2a 
Co-authorship rate ? faculty turnover measures 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
constant 0.075 
(0.30) 
0.069 
(0.29) 
0.114 
(0.46) 
0.957 
(0.39) 
self-reported 
collegiality 
0.0169*** 
(2.87) 
0.0175*** 
(3.00) 
0.0175*** 
(2.93) 
0.0180*** 
(3.05) 
USNW 2009?2014 
overall  
0.0040*** 
(7.64) 
0.0040*** 
(7.60) 
0.0036*** 
(5.81) 
0.0035*** 
(5.74) 
losses 0.0056** 
(2.44) 
gains+losses 0.0023* 
(1.69) 
loss rate 0.2601** 
(2.68) 
gain+loss rate 0.1180** 
(2.08) 
Gallup satisfaction -0.0034 
(-1.24) 
-0.0034 
(-1.25) 
-0.0036 
(-1.28) 
-0.0034 
(-1.24) 
Observations 164 164 164 164 
Pseudo R2 -1.466 -1.523 -1.437 -1.499 
 t values in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01 
** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1 
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Table 2b 
Co-authorship rate ? location-specific quality of life measures 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
constant -0.231***
(-5.09) 
-0.232***
(-5.10) 
-0.235***
(-5.13) 
0.069 
(0.29) 
-0.561 
(-1.55) 
self-reported 
collegiality 
0.0188*** 
(3.30) 
0.0192*** 
(3.39) 
0.0192*** 
(3.39) 
0.0175*** 
(3.00) 
0.0206*** 
(3.51) 
USNW 2009?
2014 overall 
0.0039*** 
(7.54) 
0.0039*** 
(7.52) 
0.0039*** 
(7.50) 
0.0040*** 
(7.60) 
0.0038*** 
(7.10) 
loss rate 0.280*** 
(2.89) 
0.279*** 
(2.87) 
0.280*** 
(2.89) 
0.260*** 
(2.68) 
0.285*** 
(2.92) 
CDC happiness -0.175 
(-1.12) 
CDC
happiness+dem 
-0.140 
(-0.87) 
CDC happiness 
+dem+inc 
-0.223 
(-0.99) 
Gallup 
satisfaction 
-0.0034 
(-1.25) 
Gallup health 0.005 
(0.92) 
Observations 164 164 164 164 164 
Pseudo R2 -1.516 -1.506 -1.510 -1.523 -1.508 
 t values in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01 
  ** p < 0.05 
* p < 0.1 
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 This second set of results in tables 2a and 2b, using co-authorship rate as 
the dependent variable, produces slightly different conclusions from those 
suggested by tables 1a and 1b.  First, self-reported collegiality did in fact result 
in more co-authorship.  The more collegial the faculty, the more co-authorship.  
The converse was not necessarily true, as in tables 1a and 1b higher co-
authorship rates did not cause respondents to self-report higher faculty 
collegiality.  
Second, across all models, two measures for faculty turnover?losses and 
loss rate?were statistically significant.  Whereas in tables 1a and 1b the losses 
were slightly more significant than loss rate, in tables 2a and 2b the reverse was 
true.  As opposed to the results reported in tables 1a and 1b, the results in tables 
2a and 2b indicate quite clearly and robustly that faculty turnover positively 
affects co-authorship rates.  This might be surprising since one might expect 
longer relationships and lower turnover to yield more co-authorships.  
Evidently not.  
Third, the higher USNW 2009?2014 overall, the higher the co-authorship 
rate.  Taking as a very large caveat the limitations of USNW data, it 
nevertheless makes intuitive sense that the higher the USNW score, the higher 
the rates of co-authorship.  In the intensely hierarchical law school world, 
higher scores mean greater resources, smaller teaching loads and, possibly on 
average, more ambitious scholars.  Co-authorship should be expected.  
However, the higher the USNW 2009?2014 overall, the lower the self-reported 
collegiality.  All other things being equal, self-reported collegiality declines as
one moves up the USNW food chain.  It may not be anomalous that faculty in 
higher-ranked schools collaborate more on co-authored articles but still report 
lower collegiality.  A balkanized faculty with factions of ambitious scholars 
might very well produce those results. 
Taken together, all of the results provide some evidence supporting 
hypothesis 1: that up to a point, higher faculty turnover leads to higher 
cooperation, but only a little evidence that local quality of life negatively affects 
cooperation.  The results also provide some evidence, more modest, supporting 
hypothesis 2: that within some limits, a higher local quality of life may lead to 
lower collegiality (but not lower co-authorship rates). 
It is interesting that collegiality seems only to be much more affected by 
loss instead of gains+losses.  In order for a faculty to remain collegial after a 
loss of a faculty member, it would need to replace that member without too 
much difficulty; otherwise a loss would be pure loss, with administrative work 
to be spread among fewer faculty members, and no fresh new faces to replace 
the lost ones. 
Further study, expanding on these preliminary results, is needed to 
understand how to distinguish these two types of measures of faculty turnover, 
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and how they affect faculty collegiality.  In any case, it would be prudent to 
emphasize that other factors, probably too idiosyncratic to measure in this type 
of study, likely play a larger role in faculty collegiality.  Certain cultures may 
be robust or not, and may exist in certain faculties or not, for reasons not studied 
here.
V. SIMULATING A MORE DYNAMIC FACULTY
Clearly, the scholarly and teaching productivity of a faculty is determined 
by many factors, but cooperation and collaboration are vital, even crucial parts 
of a faculty.  A lack of cooperation gives rise to a body that is, at its improbable 
best, merely a sum of its parts; the organization has no purpose at all.  Much 
more likely, a failure of cooperation gives rise to an organization that is less 
than the sum of its parts, as its constituent individuals spend valuable energy on 
unproductive behavior.  
This article clearly suggests that one factor, not the most important one but 
a significant one, is the extent of faculty turnover in a faculty.  There is future 
research to be done to understand exactly why some (but not too much) turnover 
leads to more cooperation, but the suggestion is that a credible threat of exit 
within a faculty may induce better behavior and more cooperation.  It is tricky 
to simulate such a balance, as the game-theoretic model in this article suggests 
it is the threat of loss and its concomitant costs that keep faculty in line.  There 
are several possibilities that can recreate some parts of this dynamic, and 
contribute to a greater level of cooperation in a law faculty.  To the extent that 
these are viewed as eroding the security of tenure, they are unsurprisingly 
controversial among academics, and the literature might be expected to be 
scant. 
A. Post-tenure Review 
First, Michael Swygert and Nathaniel Gozanksy have suggested that some 
level of post-tenure review might be appropriate, to reduce shirking.202  Post-
tenure reviews are fairly common in institutions of higher education 
generally,203 but not in law schools.204  Goals and processes differ widely among 
different institutions, some oriented towards accountability, and some towards 
202. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 116, at 357 (?[The] underproductiveness among senior 
law faculty members in American law schools is disturbingly widespread.?).
203. See, e.g., Christine M. Licata & Joseph C. Morreale, Post-Tenure Review: National Trends, 
Questions and Concerns, 24 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 5, 6?7 (1999) (surveying studies of post-
tenure processes, and citing figures of between 46% and 61%). 
204. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 116, at 357. 
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faculty development.205  Some are annual, others periodic, in the range of five 
to seven years.206
Trying to soften the effects of what could be an embarrassing or wrenching 
process, Swygert and Gozansky suggest that the orientation of such a review 
process should be towards helping colleagues, not necessarily judging them.207
If tenured faculty members are asked what they are doing and answer 
?nothing,? then they suggest the gentle rejoinder, ?[w]hy? Can we help??208
And even if a faculty member has no publications, a peer-driven, post-tenure 
review process should next delve into whether the faculty member is engaging 
in other professionally or institutionally worthwhile activities, presumably to 
be interpreted broadly.209
Such an approach, now three decades since Swygert and Gozansky 
suggested it, seems a bit Pollyannaish but constructive.  Certainly, if tenured 
professors shirk, then silence about shirking seems to effectively license it, and 
possibly communicates to other faculty that such behavior is reconcilable with 
institutional goals, or that it is some form of delayed compensation for past 
years of service to the law school.  Certainly, as faculty members age, the nature 
of their contribution to the institution and the academy change,210 and 
recognition of the value of a diverse variety of contributions would seem wise.  
But it would be incongruous to not expect any contributions at all.  To the extent 
a peer-driven, post-tenure review at least opens up a conversation about 
contributions to the institution, it cannot be a step in the wrong direction.  
Moreover, such a conversation, properly oriented, may lead to forms of 
collaboration.  If a mandate to assist hobbled colleagues is truly part of the 
process, then it is likely that some collaboration is required of faculty 
colleagues.  
A post-tenure review may not even have at the end of its process the 
possibility of dismissal.  A review could be just that: an open and frank, and 
hopefully nuanced discussion about contributions to law school life.  Even if it 
does not hold out the promise of a formal sanction, it may activate, and perhaps 
even generate norms that might deter shirking or fighting. 
205. Licata & Morreale, supra note 203, at 11. 
206. Id. at 7?8. 
207. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 116, at 366. 
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Raymond P. Perry et al., Faculty in Transition: A Longitudinal Analysis of Perceived 
Control and Type of Institution in the Research Productivity of Newly Hired Faculty , 41 RES. HIGHER 
EDUC. 165, 171 (2000). 
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If a post-tenure review does have at the end of its process the possibility of 
dismissal, procedural protections are in order.  Flowing from the Swygert and 
Gozansky suggestion, a post-tenure review committee could be charged with 
exhausting all reasonable attempts to assist faculty members who find 
themselves in a rut.  Or, if there is a grievance that animates a faculty conflict, 
post-tenure review would be a forum for addressing such a grievance.  
Grievance procedures in the academy have sometimes effectively dealt with 
serious grievances, such as civil rights cases or other forms of discrimination, 
but not always.211  For problems that do not rise to that level, such grievance 
procedures are hopelessly and notoriously bureaucratic and ineffective.212  A 
post-tenure review might provide an alternative forum for airing lower-level 
grievances that give rise to faculty conflict and interfere with productivity.  It 
is unlikely that it would be much worse than what most academic units currently 
have. 
Implicit in the Swygert and Gozansky proposal, but unstated, is extra 
faculty oversight.  For law schools embedded within universities, promotion 
and tenure decisions must pass through university-level committees, so that any 
status change based on a post-tenure review committee must also pass 
university muster.213  The standard for dismissal is generally adequate cause,214
and a post-tenure review process should take place against the backdrop of this 
high bar.  But that substantive standard might be supplemented with additional 
hurdles, such as an evidentiary standard.215  Any kind of a post-tenure process 
that might generate a recommendation for termination should pass a higher 
evidentiary bar than that of ?he said, she said.?
Tenure is an inherently stressful process,216 and post-tenure review has the 
potential to be more so.217  But with some procedural protections to guard 
against the weaponization of such a review process to bludgeon or threaten 
211. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as 
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 447 (1999). 
212. See, e.g., R. Rhodes & J. J. Strain, Whistleblowing in Academic Medicine, 30 J. MED.
ETHICS 35, 35 (2004) (?This is not to say that venues for employee grievances and hearing complaints 
about harassment do not exist: they do, but they are seldom used, they subject the user to bias, and they 
quite often remain ineffective.?). 
213. Swygert & Gozansky, supra note 116, at 360?67. 
214. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
215. Brown & Kurland, supra note 86, at 344. 
216. H. Carol Greene et al., Building a Support System Toward Tenure: Challenges and Needs 
of Tenure-Track Faculty in Colleges of Education, 16 MENTORING & TUTORING: PARTNERSHIP IN 
LEARNING 429, 429 (2008). 
217. Licata & Morreale, supra note 203, at 10 (?Because the term ?post-tenure review? conjures 
up negative images of a re-tenuring process, some institutions have purposely steered away from using 
it.?). 
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colleagues, some minimum level of communication and review would seem to 
be necessary to bring problematic behavior, shirking, or personal problems, out 
of the shadows.  
B. Involuntary Sabbaticals 
One intermediate sanction short of dismissal and potentially stemming from 
a post-tenure review could be an involuntary sabbatical.  Sabbaticals for 
academics are usually considered one of the most important benefits of 
academia.218  Teaching and faculty service obligations are suspended for the 
period of the sabbatical,219 and the professor typically draws some level of pay 
less than full salary.220  I propose as an intermediate sanction for bad behavior 
(be it shirking or fighting), a less favorable sabbatical, one with considerably 
less compensation than is offered for normal, scheduled sabbaticals.  It is 
beyond the scope of this article to fully visit the employment law issues raised 
by this proposal,221 except to say that if dismissal after procedure is permitted, 
so should an involuntary sabbatical.  As an intermediate sanction, the usual 
procedural safeguards for academics are in order,222 but an involuntary 
sabbatical could serve a number of pro-cooperation goals.  
First, and consistent with the traditional ideal of the sabbatical, an 
involuntary sabbatical could give the individual faculty member stuck in a rut 
the opportunity to re-tool or re-orient, and gain a fresh perspective on an overall 
research agenda.223  Shirking or fighting are often symptoms of something gone 
awry in a professorial career,224 and an involuntary sabbatical can play the role 
that normal, traditional sabbaticals are meant to play: a modestly compensated, 
professional time-out in the hopes that the individual can re-enter the academy 
with renewed purpose.225  Such individual renewal benefits the institution as a 
?refurbishing of its equipment.?226
218. Celina M. Sima, The Role and Benefits of the Sabbatical Leave in Faculty Development 
and Satisfaction, 105 NEW DIRECTION INSTITUTIONAL RES. 67, 67 (2000). 
219. Id. at 71. 
220. Walter Crosby Eells, The Origin and Early History of Sabbatical Leave, 48 AAUP BULL.
253, 253 (1962). 
221. For one such review, see Megan E. Blomquist, A Shield, Not a Sword: Involuntary Leave 
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 76 WASH. L. REV. 509 (2001). 
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225. Sima, supra note 218, at 72?73. 
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Sabbatical requests typically include the submission of a research plan for 
how the time off of teaching and service will be spent,227 and the submission of 
a report afterwards that describes how it was actually spent, and what was 
accomplished.228  Failure to accomplish the goals set out in the sabbatical report 
usually raises eyebrows;229 such a failure following an involuntary sabbatical 
could lead to dismissal.  Such an exercise would appear to be an excellent 
opportunity for an individual faculty member and her colleagues to discuss the 
nature of contributions to the law school.  Again, it is natural to be skeptical 
that such a process will lead to the hoped-for outcomes, but it compares 
favorably with the alternative of putting up with unsustainably bad behavior.  
Second, if an involuntary sabbatical is onerous enough, it can serve as a 
deterrent to bad behavior.  This raises, however, the delicate question of salary 
during involuntary sabbatical, one that is critical in determining its failure or 
success as an intermediate sanction for bad behavior.  It is worth identifying, 
without necessarily resolving, the tension in setting a compensation rate: an 
involuntary sabbatical that provides too little salary may truly infringe upon the 
rights of faculty members.  On the other hand, an involuntary sabbatical with 
too much salary, looking too much like a regular, sought-after benefit, would 
fail utterly to deter bad behavior, and would only engender resentment leading 
to more bad behavior.  Striking the right balance could require some external 
input, such as from a university body. 
Third, and finally, apart from the usual institutional benefits of an 
individual taking a sabbatical, an involuntary sabbatical as an intermediate 
sanction has the benefit of removing an individual that is somehow a problem 
on a faculty.  Shirking or fighting are so poisonously demoralizing that even 
costly attempts to remove?hopefully temporarily?problematic individuals 
are cost-effective.  And if the involuntary sabbatical actually works to 
rejuvenate a faculty member and bring her back into the productive fold of the 
faculty, then the cost will have paid for itself many times over.  
VI. CONCLUSION
The results reported in this article provide some support for the first 
hypothesis: that up to a certain point, some faculty turnover either enhances 
collegiality, or is a sign of intellectual health, not strife.  The results also provide 
some support for the second hypothesis (less so than for the first hypothesis): 
that a strong local quality of life may lead to lower collegiality.  It may surprise 
227. Sima, supra note 218, at 69 (referencing to ?sabbatical plans?). 
228. Id. (????aculty must be required to return to service after the leave and must file a sabbatical 
report.?). 
229. Id. at 68. 
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some that faculty turnover?which sounds bad?has a positive effect on faculty 
collegiality and collaboration.  It may also surprise some that high local quality 
of life?which sounds good?may have the opposite effect (though the results 
in this study are very modest).  But the interactive nature of faculty cooperation, 
along with the institution of tenure, render it an organization that is unlike many 
others.  
What the results suggest is that faculty turnover is not necessarily a negative 
reflection on an academic unit, but may instead be a sign of intellectual health.  
It could be that a productive faculty means that some will be lost to lateral 
moves.  To the extent that central university administrations view faculty 
turnover as a failure?the more turnover the greater the failure?this article 
suggests that such a view could be mistaken.  
Moving forward, the question remains of how to get law faculty to 
cooperate better and collaborate more on scholarly output.  This article suggests 
that introducing a level of dynamism might be required, even if it impinges 
upon (without, it bears repeating, significantly curtailing) the institution of 
tenure.  This article suggests some steps that may act to dis-incentivize bad 
behavior that may depress cooperation and collaboration: shirking and fighting.  
First, the institution of post-tenure review, even in its most mild and benign 
forms, holds great potential to bring into the open festering problems that may 
lead faculty to shirk or fight.  Second, and following on the suggestion of 
instituting post-tenure reviews, involuntary sabbaticals may serve as another 
mechanism for both dis-incentivizing bad behavior and also defusing faculty 
conflicts.  The chances of success for either of these processes are unclear, but 
the costs of instituting such procedures are far outweighed by the potential 
benefits of doing so.  For too long, law faculties have suffered silently through 
intra-faculty conflicts that have been far too costly for the academy, and for law 
students. 
*    *    * 
 
 
